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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General Of Idaho, ex rei STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.
STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE
BACON, in his official capacity as Director
of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants/Respondents.
and
GLADYS BABCOCK, et. AI.,
Defendants-In-Intervention-Respondents
and
PRIEST LAKE STATE LESSEES ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
Defendant Intervenor-Respondents

GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the Babcock
TRUST, et. AI.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE
BACON, in his official capacity as Director
of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court 39084-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2010-23751

Valley County Docket No. 2010-436

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley.

Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge
Presiding
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General, State of Idaho
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor
Boise, ID 83720

Merlyn Clark
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, ID 83720

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DfSTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAUR<\ L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
of the
SANDRA
RUMPH,
as
trustee
BROMAGEN
TRUST~
MONTFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTON[OLI; MARTIN 1. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNE FIX
of
the
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; L¥NNE KIN"NEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KIN'NEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER.
]V LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA 1. ANDERSON and.
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DIN GEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DO~A DAY
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORlE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN
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DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the I
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY.
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LlVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRICKSON,
as
Co-Trustees of the
HENRIKSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES i
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HrPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH 1
HO]\;; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH~ STEVEN D. and DAWN 1. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the EST ATE OF
CHARLES R. KlJ'\G, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LElSV FAMIL Y LAND TReST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEAr..TN !
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA. as Trustee of the MILDRED 1.
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERLY A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT 1. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
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Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KATY L. REYNOLDS; M]CHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D.
RULE;
EOWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the s-s
FAMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDruC v.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMITH. as Co-Trustees of the
S:vtITH FAMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABJAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESUE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESUE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARt'v1STRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMIL Y TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN,

I

I

PLaintiffs,
vs.

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.
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COME NOW the

above~named

plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall,

Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and for good cause against the above-named defendants,
complain and allege as follows:

I.
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County,

Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant, Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"),
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land
Board and promises made to the Land Board.

The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and

remedies with respect to the parcels of real property.
2.

The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of

the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's
public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.

3.

Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands

("Department of Lands").

The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho,

established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-121,
Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties, countersigning leases issued by the president
of the Land Board for rental of state enduwment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state
nonnal schools and the state hospital.

II.
JURISDICTION and VENUE

4.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they

an either reside in

or do business in the state of Idaho.

COMPLAIl'T- 4

4

5.

The amount in controversy exceeds the jUrisdictional minimum ofthis Court.

6.

The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County,

7.

Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-40] .

Idaho.

III.
FACTS
The Land Board's Constitutional and StatutOry Direction

8.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide

for the rental of all state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which
granted, or to the state if not specifically granted.
9.

Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state

land at a rental amount fixed and detennined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307,
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to
thirty-five (35) years.
10.

The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real

property which is leased for recreational residential purposes.

Plaintiffs' leases all concerned

cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases."
11.

Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be

applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances,
Idaho Code § 58-310 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore, with the annual rent to be established

by the Land Board.

However, Idaho Code § 58-310A provides that the conflict auction and

5
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application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead,
Idaho Code § S&·310A directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease.

The Terms of the Currently Existio2: Cottage Site Leases
12.

The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state

lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on

January 1,2001. The existing leases will tenninate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site.
13.

The lease provides for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the

leased premises, as determined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation
is determined by the assessor. The rent is payable on or before January 1 of each year, and is
paid one year in advance.

Rent may increase or decrease effective January 1 of any calendar

year, in accordance with the 2.5% formula.
14.

For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites

arc valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will
rely on lot values as established by the VaHey County Assessor.
] 5.

The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold

approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal.
16.

If a request to renew is denied, the lease provides the Land Board will pay

the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed on the leased
premises.

The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the

improvements on the lease's expiration date.
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17.

In the event of an expiration or termination of the lease for any reason

other than default by the lessee, and in the event Land Board leases the land to a new
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to
the prior lessee.
18.

The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently

enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the
lease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and

laws of the state of Idaho or other govemmental entities.
19.

The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application

and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58-310.
20.

Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs

would be given a right to renew the leases on their current terms, and that Plaintiffs
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or
maintain valuable, permanent approved improvements on the cottage sites.

These

improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use.
21.

On March 16,2010, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for

the new term from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the 1.5% increase phased
in over a 5-year period.
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Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases
22.

In early 2010, Plaintiffs informed the Land Board, in writing, of their intent to

exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional
10 year period, effective January 1,2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same terms
set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less.
23.

On March 12, 15, 16 and 17,2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a fonn

letter which was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received
Plaintiffs' notices renewlng their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs'
notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenus.
The Department informed Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their

leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board
in March 2010.
24.

Thereafter, on or about March 31, 2010, the Department of Lands mailed

Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the
4% rental rate fonnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting. The letter
advised Plaintiffs that they bad until April 30 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00
nonrefundable application fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue
the existing lease tenus. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused
renewal of the eXlsting lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms.
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25.

Plaintiffs thereafter again gave written notice of their intent to renew. In

exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made
clear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made
on the basis of the existing lease terms.

26.

As of the filing of this Complaint neither the Department of Lands nor the Land

Board have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage
site leases.

27.

Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of

Lands. dated March 31. 20 I0, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the
renewal leases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases,
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value.

IV.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I - Breach of Contract/Specific Performance
(Relating to Existing Cottage Site Leases)
28.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

29.

Plaintiffs entered into a valid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage

sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a 1O-year period, with a right to renew under the
same lease terms, including the same rental rate.
30.

Plaintiffs, with the approval of the Land Board andlor Department of Lands,

constructed andlor maintained valuable improvements On their leaseholds.
31.

Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to

renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease teons and by statute.
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32.

The Land Board has breached the tenns of the contract by refusing to recognize

Plaintiffs' right to renew the lease contract under the same terms, including the same rental rate.
Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

33.
lease contract.
34.

Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach

are inadequate due to the unique nature of the real property at issue.
Plaintiffs therefore seek specific performance of the existing cottage site leases,

35.

including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period(s) under the terms present in the existing
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate.
COUNT II - Breach of Contract
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase of Cottage Site Improvements)
36.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

37.

The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plaintiffs apply to renew their

leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of
the improvements.
38.

The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing terms,

including the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their
respective lots.
39.

The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it intends to

purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby
breaching the terms of its lease with Plaintiffs.
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40.

Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board.
41.

Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and

either: (a) obtain specific performance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b)
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on
their respective leaseholds.

COUNT III - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of the Idaho Constitution)

42.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

43.

The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4%

of property value does not secure the maximum long-tenn financial return to the grantees of the
cottage sites andlor the state.
44.

By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess

of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-term

financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate formula.
45.

Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are

interested andlor atfected parties under Idaho's Uniform Declaratory 1udgment Act, codified at

I.e. §§

10-1201 through 10-1217.
46.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16, 20 I 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the
[daho Constitution.
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COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding the Land Board's Violation off.C. § 58-310A)
47.

Plaintiffs incorporate aU previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

48.

The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for

the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent.
49.

By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the

Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites.
50.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16,20] 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.C. § 58-31 OA.

COUNT V - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding the Land Board's Unconstitutional Application on.c. § 58-310A)
51.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

52.

The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage

sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by
53.

I.e. § 58-31 OA.

The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property

value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the
state.
54.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16,

2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Anicle IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 58-31 OA.

COUNT VI - Injunctive Relief
55.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

56.

Plaintiffs will suffer great andJor irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is

allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew
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their leases on the existing lease tenns, or will lose their valuable improvements without
receiving fair and just compensation.

57.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the

Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms.

VII.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
58.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &

Blanton, P,A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney
fees and costs relative to their prosecution ofthis action.
59.

Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and

reasonable attorney fees incurred pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements

and Idaho Code § 12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. and any other contractual provision,
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows:
I.

For a declaratory judgment that the March 16,2010 decision of the Land Board is

unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.e. § 58-31OA andlor in violation of I.e. §

58·310A;
2.

For an Order enjoining the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands from

including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in

Plaintiffs' existing leases;

COMPLAINT· 13

13

3.

For an Order directing the Land Board and/or the Department of Lands to provide

Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same tenns as Plaintiffs'
existlng leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites;
4.

That, in the event the Court detennines the Land Board is entitled to impose a

new rental rate fonnula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the
opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate fonnula
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 2010 letter;

5.

That in the alternative, Plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be

determined;
6.

That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in

prosecuting this action;
7.

That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is

decided by default~ and
8.

All other relief which the Court deems just and equitable.

DA TED this

££.y of October, 20 l O.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904, pso@haJlfarley.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA 1. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH.
as
trustee
of the
SANDRA
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MONTFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX
of
the
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNETT O. DAY and DONNA DAY
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD & 1
MARJORIE DA Y TRUST~ DA VlD THATCHER!
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN
DUCHARME
DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
DUCHAR.J\1E REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY
and
BARBARA
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
FARBER; JOSEPH 1 FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOW ARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA I
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT:
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRICKSON,
as
Co-Trustees
of the
HENRIKSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HlLLJARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the ESTATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEA?\"N
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN.
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGCSON
TRUST;
DONNA
MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. P1STEY, as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KA TY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RlDDLE~ SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DA VrD ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CY"l':DY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V. !
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the
S~ITH FAMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIA1\";
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP I
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZA::-.lNE ZIMMERMAt'J; LINDA S. TURNER;
GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,

I

I

Plaintiffs,
VS.
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISS]O~ERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

COME NOW the above-named plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall,
Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A, and for good cause against the above-named defendants,
complain and allege as follows:
I.

PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County,

Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant. Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"),
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land
Board and promises made to the Land Board.

The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and

remedies with respect to the parcels of real property.

2.

The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of

the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's

public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.
3.

Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands

("Department of Lands").

The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho,

established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code §

58~ 121,

Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties. countersigning leases issued by the president

of the Land Board for rental of state endowment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state
nonnal schools and the state hospital.
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II.

JURISDICTION and VENUE
4.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they all either reSlde in

or do business in the state of Idaho.

5.

The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court,

6.

The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County,

7.

Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401.

[daho.

III.
FACTS
The Land Board's Constitutional and Statutory Direction
8.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide

for the rental of all state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such
manner as will secure the maximum long.term financial return to the institution to which
granted, or to the state if not specifically granted.
9.

Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state

land at a rental amount fixed and detennined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307,
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to
thirty-five (35) years.
10.

The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real

property which is leased for recreational residential purposes.

Plaintiffs' leases all concerned

cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases."
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11.

Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be

applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances,
Idaho Code § 58-3] 0 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore, with the annual rent to be established

by the Land Board.

However, Idaho Code § 58-310A provides that the conflict auction and

application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead,
Idaho Code § 58-310A directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot
generates market rent throughout the duratjon of the lease.

The Terms of the Currently Existing Cottage Sjte Leases
12.

The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state

lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on
January I, 2001. The existing leases will terminate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site.

13.

The lease provjdes for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the

leased premises, as determined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation
is determined by the assessor. The rent is payabJe on or before January 1 of each year, and is
paid one year in advance.

Rent may increase Or decrease effective January I of any calendar

year, in accordance with the 2.5% formula.
14.

For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites

are valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will
rely on lot values as established by the Valley County Assessor.
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15.

The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold

approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal.

16.

If a request to renew is denied, the lease provides the Land Board will pay

the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed on the leased
premises. The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the
improvements on the lease's expiration date.

17.

In the event of an expiration or tennination of the lease for any reason

other than default by the lessee, and in the event I.and Board leases the land to a new
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to
the prior lessee.

t 8.

The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently

enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the
lease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and
laws of the state of Jdaho or other governmental entities.
19.

The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application

and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58-310.
20.

Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs

would be given a right to renew the leases on their current tenns, and that Plaintiffs
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or

AMEl\,])ED COMPLAINT - 7

21

maintain vaJuabJe, permanent approved improvements on the cottage sites.

These

improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use.
On March 16,20]0, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for

21.

the new tenn from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the 1.5% increase phased

in over a 5-year period.
Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases
22.

In early 2010, Plaintiffs informed the Land Board, in wTiting, of their intent to

exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional
10 year period, effective January 1, 2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same tenns

set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less.
23.

On March 12, 15, 16 and 17,2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a fonn

Jetter whicn was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received
Plaintiffs' notices renewing their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs'

notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenns.
The Department informed Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their
leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board
in March 2010.
24.

Thereafter, on or about March 31,2010, the Department of Lands mailed

Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the
4% rental rate fonnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 20 10 meeting. The letter
advised Plaintiffs that they had until April )0 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00
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nonrefundab1e appJication fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue
the existing lease terms. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused
renewal of the existing lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms.
25.

Plaintiffs thereafter again gave

~'Titten

notice of their intent to renew. In

exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made
clear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made

on the basis of the existing lease terms.
26.

As of the filing of this Complaint, neither the Department of Lands nor the Land

Board have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage
site leases.
27.

Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of

Lands, dated March 31, 2010, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the
renewal [eases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases,
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value.

III/
II/I
II/I

1//1
1111

I1I1
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IV.

CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I - Breach of Contract/Specific Performance
(Relating to Existing Cottage Site Leases)
28.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

29.

Plaintiffs entered into a valid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage

sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a lO-year period, with a right to renew under the
same lease tenos, including the same rental rate.
30.

Plaintiffs, with the approval of the Land Board andlor Department of Lands,

constructed andlor maintained valuable improvements on their leaseholds.
31.

Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to

renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease terms and by statute.

32.

The Land Board has breached the terms of the contract by refusing to recognize

Plaintiffs' right to renew lhe lease contract under the same tenns, including the same rental rate.
33.

Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

lease contract.
34.

Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach

are inadequate due to the unique nature of the real property at issue.
35.

Plaintiffs therefore seek specific performance of the existing cottage site leases,

including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period{s) under the terms present in the existing
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate.
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COUNT II - Breach of Contract
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase of Cottage Site Improvements}
36.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

37.

The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plaintiffs apply to renew their

leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of
the improvements.

38.

The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing terms,

induding the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their
respective lots.
39.

The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it intends to

purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby
breaching the terms of its lease with Plaintiffs.
40.

Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board.
4i .

Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and

either: (a) obtain specific performance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b)
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on
their respective leaseholds.

III1
/1//

ill!
II1I
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COUNT [II - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding the Land Board's Violation of the Idaho Constitution)
42.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

43.

The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4%

of property value does not secure the maximum long-term financial return to the grantees of the
cottage sites and/or the state.

44.

By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess

of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-term
financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate formula.

45.

Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are

interested and/or affected parties under [daho's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at

I.e. §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217.
46.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX. Section 8 of the
Idaho Constitution.

COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of I.e. § S8-31OA)
47.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

48.

The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for

the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent.
49.

By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the

Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites.
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50.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16, 20 I 0 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.e. § 58-31 OA.

COUNT V - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Unconstitutional Application on.c. § 58-310Al

51.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

52.

The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage

sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by l.c. § 58-31 OA.

53.

The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property

value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the
state.

54.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16,

2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the [daho
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of LC. § 58-31 OA.

COUNT VI- Injunctive Relief
55.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

56.

Plaintiffs will suffer great andlor irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is

allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew
their leases on the existing lease terms, or will lose their valuable improvements without
receiving fair and just compensation.
57.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the

Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms.
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VII.
CLAIM FOR A TTOR;.~EY FEES AND COSTS

58.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &

Blanton, P.A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney
fees and costs relative to their prosecution of this action.
59.

Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and

reasonable attorney fees incurred pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements
and fdaho Code §12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other contractual provision,
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action.
PRA YER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows:

].

For a declaratory judgment that the March 16,2010 decision of the Land Board is

unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 58-3 lOA and/or in violation of I.e. §
58-310A;

2.

For an Order enjoining the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands from

including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in
Plajntiffs' existing leases;
3.

For an Order directing the Land Board and/or the Department of Lands to provide

Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same terms as Plaintiffs'
existing leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites;

4.

That, in the event the Court determines the Land Board is entitled to impose a

new rental rate formula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the
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opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate formula
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 2010 letter;
5.

That in the alternative. Plaintiffs be awarded damages m an amount to be

de tenni ned;
6.

That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in

prosecuting this action;

7.

That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is

decided by default; and

8.

AU other relief which the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

l

day of Nov ember, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

l'tt"j .. i · U
By: \~W-¥.--\~}-'--':,-r:';.-..-=-===-----
Phillip S. Oberrecht -X>fthe Firm
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

L.

3586
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
STEVEN

OLSEN, ISB No.

ISS. No. 6385
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Fax: (208) 854-8073
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CLA YR. SMITH,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARlES,
Plaintiff,
VS.

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON,
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

cv

0 C 1 0 2 3 75 1'.
No. _ _ _ _--'-

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

)

)
)

INTRODUCTION

I.

(a)

Plaintiff Lawrence G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of

Idaho, brings this action on behalf of beneficiaries of the income generated from the
management of endowment lands located at or near Payette and Priest Lakes and commonly
referred to as the "cottage sites." Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution imposes upon
Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board") responsibility for "the direction,
control and disposition of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may be
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prescribed by law." Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution imposes upon the Land
Board the duty "to provide for the location, prote'ction, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore,
or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government,
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the
maximum long term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state if not
specifically granted," and imposes upon the Idaho Legislature the duty, inter alia, to "provide by
law that the general grants of land made by congress shall be judiciously located and carefully
preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the
respective object for which said grants were made."
(b)

The Legislature purported to discharge its duty under Article IX, Section

8 with respect to the leasing of the cottage sites through passage of 1990 Idaho Session Laws
chapter 187, now codified at Idaho Code § 58-31OA (" 1990 Act"). In summary, the 1990 Act
removed the cottage sites from the "conflict auction" requirements in Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and
-310 that had applied, with several amendments, since 1905 (1905 Idaho Sess. L. 131,137,13839 (House Bill No. 130, §§ 15, \8)). and directed the Land Board instead to "insure that each
leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease."
(c)

The Land Board has purported to fulfill its statutory duty

unde~IOA'

and its constitutional obligation to secure maximum long term financial returns, by establishing
rental rates that unlawfully elevate the interests of lessees above the interests of the beneficiaries
and, by the admission ofa majority of Land Board members, do not obtain market rent.
(d)

Plaintiff seeks a determination that the Legislature's exemption of cottage

sites from the public auction requirement in Article IX, Section 9 is void on its face and that the
Land Board is acting outside its authority in establishing rents that do not fulfill its constitutional
and statutory obligations to endowment beneficiaries. Declaratory relief so determining should
issue, together with preliminary and permanent injunctions that restrain the Land Board and
Defendant George Bacon from giving prospective effect to Idaho Code § 58-31 OA.
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(e)

Plaintiff further seeks a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease

rates established by the Land Board at its March 16, 2010 meeting violate its constitutional duty
to "secure the maximum long-term financial return" of the affected endowment land
beneficiaries. In the event the Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58-310A is constitutional,
Plaintive seeks alternatively a declaratory judgment that the cottage-site lease rates to be
implemented in the next lease term violate the statutory mandate to secure market rent
throughout the duration of the lease.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho Code § 1-705.1. Venue in

2.

this Court exists under Idaho Code § 5-402.2 because the actions and/or conduct giving rise to
this controversy arose in the City of Boise, County of Ada.

3.

Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the State of ldaho. The Attorney General of

Idaho is an office established by Article IV, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. The Attorney
General is required by Idaho Code § 58-120 to represent the State ofIdaho "in all suits, actions,
contests or controversies relating to or involving state lands."

The Attorney General has

authority under the common law and under Idaho Code § 67-140](5), to "supervise ... persons
holding property subject to any public or charitable trust and to enforce whenever necessary any
noncompliance or departure from the general purpose of such trust" and to "institute, in the name
of the state, any proceeding necessary to enforce compliance with the terms of the trust or any
departure therefrom." The Attorney General brings this action on behalf of entities to whose
benefit income from cottage site leases accrue, which include Idaho public school districts, Idaho
normal schools, the Idaho state hospital, and such entities' students and patients.
4.

Defendant Land Board is established under Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho

Constitution and consists of five statewide-elected Idaho officers: Governor, Superintendent of
Public Instruction, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Controller. See also Idaho
Code § 53-10 1.
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5.

The Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL") is the executive agency established to

administer state endowment lands. Idaho Code §§ 58-10 1 and -119. Defendant George Bacon is
the IDL Director. Defendant Bacon's duties and responsibilities include preparing endowment
land leases for Land Board consideration and countersigning such leases with the Land Board
president, including leases for the cottage sites. Idaho Code § 58-121.

B.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
6.

Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution is entitled "State Board of Land

Commissioners" and provides: "The governor, superintendent of public instruction, secretary of
state, attorney general and state controller shall constitute the state board of land commissioners,
who shall have the direction, control and disposition of the public lands of the state. under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law." See also Idaho Code § 58-101.
7.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution is entitled "Location and

disposition of public lands" and provides:

It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location,
protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted
to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, under such regulations as
may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum long term
financia1 return to the institution to which granted or to the state jf not specifically
granted; provided, that no state lands shaH be sold for less than the appraised price. No
law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to persons who may
have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent to the survey thereof by the general
government, by which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such
lands. shall be diminished, directly or indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest
practicable period. provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to
the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to
disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said
grants of land were made, and the legislature shall provide for the sale of said lands
from time to time and for the sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful
application of the proceeds thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants;
provided, that not to exceed one hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone
year, and to be sold in subdivisions of not to exceed three hundred and twenty acres of
land to anyone individual, company or corporation. The legislature shall have power to
authorize the state board of land commissioners to exchange granted or acquired lands
of the state on an equa1 value basis for other lands under agreement with the United
States, local units of government, corporations. companies. individuals, or combinations
thereof.
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See also Idaho Code § 58-119(3) (referring to lands held in

trust)~

§ 58-133

(same)~

§ 58-136

(same); and § 58-156(3) (declaring that "the endo\\-ment lands are held in trust by the state board
of land commissioners and are managed to generate the maximum long-term financial returns to
the public school endowment").
8.

Section 58-310A, Idaho Code, is entitled "Legislative findings and purposes-

Leases of single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites not subject to conflict
application and auction provisions" and provides:
(I) The legislature of the state of Idaho finds:
(a) That from time to time single family, recreational cottage site and homesite
leases have been the target of conflict applications to lease said premises and
property;
(b) That single family, recreational cottage sites and homesites have typically
been held by the same family, sometimes for as long as fifty (50) years;
(c) That conflict applications for a lease require the state board of land
commissioners to hold an auction between the applicants and award the lease to
the highest bidder;
(d) That existing statutes allow the board no discretion in rejecting applications,
and only limited discretion in rejecting bids, notably for collusion or similar
irregularities in the bidding process;
(e) That, in the case of single family, recreational cottage site and homesite
leases, the conflict application and auction procedure have caused considerable
consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the prospect of losing a longtime lease;
(f) That, although conflict applications have been filed from time to time, the
board has never held a contlict auction or realized any direct revenue from such
appl ications;
(g) That section 8, article IX, of the constitution of the state of Idaho provides
that the board manage state endowment lands in such manner as will secure the
maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the
state if not specifically granted;
(h) That maximum long-term financial returns to the institutions to which
granted are best obtained through stable leases at market rent.
(2) It is hereby declared that leases for single family, recreational cottage sites and
homesites shall not be subject to the conflict application and auction provisions of
sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code. The board shall reject any and all pending and
future contlict applications tiled under sections 58-307 and 58-310, Idaho Code, for
single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases.
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(3) In the absence of the contlict application and auction procedure in the single family,
recreational cottage site and homesite lease, and lease renewal process, the board shall
insure that each leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease.
C.

HISTORY OF THE COTTAGE SITES' LEASING PROGRAM
9.

The Land Board currently leases 355 recreational home sites on Priest Lake and

167 recreational home sites on Payette Lake. The recreational home sites have traditionally been
referred to as "cottage sites." The 355 cottage sites at Priest Lake are located on public school
lands. Of the 167 cottage sites at Payette Lake, two are located on public school lands, 56 on
normal school lands, and 109 on state hospital lands. The majority of the cottage sites were first
leased in the mid-1940s and early- t 950s, though some date back to as early as 1924. Each
cottage site lot is owned in fee simple by the State of Idaho as trustee for public schools, normal
schools (Idaho State University, Department of Education, and Lewis-Clark State College), and
the state hospital. The improvements on the cottage site lots are owned by the lessees.
10.

Until 1990, expiring cottage site leases were "subject to disposal at public

auction" pursuant to the provisions of Article IX, Section 8 and Idaho Code § 58-3] 0, the latter
of which prescribes procedures for "conflict auctions." The Land Board followed practicessuch as advertising public auctions by posting notices of availability only on the local court
house bulletin board rather than advertising them as they did on other expiring leases-that
discouraged conflict auctions.

Consequently, prior to 1990, few applications for conflict

auctions were received and none had proceeded to auction. In lieu of establishing market rents
by public auction, the Land Board used flat rental rates until 1986, when IOL estimated that the
state was receiving a return on assets value of only 0.67 per cent for all cottage site leases.
Thereafter, the Land Board adopted a rental rate of 2.5% of the value of the cottage site, to be
phased in over a period of years.
11.

As an adjunct to annual rent, the Land Board, starting in /981, imposed what it

described as "premium rent." Premium rent is not rent at all; rather, it refers to the requirement
that lessees pay 10% of the leasehold value upon assignment or transfer of the lease to someone
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outside the lessee's immediate family. Leasehold value is determined by subtracting the value of
the improvements and the personal property from the total sale price.

IDAPA 20.03.13.25.

Board members, IDL staff, and outside consultants have repeatedly stated that the large
leasehold values upon which premium rent is based would not accrue if annual rents were set at
market rates. Premium rent was adopted so that when lessees assigned leaseholds for value, "the
State could share in the profit" that lessees enjoy when assigning leases for value.

By rule,

premium rent was to expire "December 31, 1992 or until contract rents have been increased to
full market rents, whichever comes first." IDAPA 20.03.13.27. Although the premium rent rule
expired in 1992, the Board, in recognition of the fact that annual rents remained well below fair
market value, has continued to impose the premium rent requirement as a matter of policy and
contract.
12.

By 1990 demand for cottage site leases had increased significantly, so that buyers

were willing to pay substantial amounts of money to purchase leaseholds from existing lessees.
Two pending applications for conflict auction prompted the Land Board to delay the applications
so that the Legislature could address existing lessees' concerns over application of the conflictauction process.

D.

ELIMINATION OF PUBLIC AUCTION REQUIREMENT
13.

In written testimony submitted to the Legislature in 1990, cottage site lessees

asserted that conflict auctions were unfair because all conflict-auction proceeds belong to the
State and argued that they would lose the substantial amounts of money paid to predecessor
lessees for the right to assume the lease. The Legislature, expressing concern over, inter alia, the
fact "the contlict application and auction procedure have caused considerable consternation and
dismay to the existing lessees at the prospect of losing a long-time lease" (Idaho Code § 58310A(l)(e)), abolished the use of public auctions as a means of establishing market rents and
established a general requirement that the Board "ensure that each lot generates market rent
throughout the duration of the lease" (id. § 58-310A(3»).
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14.

Imposition on the Land Board of the duty to determine the appropriate "market

rate" requirement resulted directly from removing the public auction requirement. The term
"market rate, according to an economic analysis prepared for the Land Board in 2008, refers to
If

"the most probable rent that a property should bring in a competitive and open market reflecting
all conditions and restrictions of the specified lease agreement including term, rental adjustments
and reevaluation, permitted uses, use restrictions, and expense obligations."

Consequently,

"[w]hen contract rent equals market rent, the leasedfee estate is nearly equivalent in value to the
fee simple estate because if the property were to become vacant, the lessor could likely find
another tenant who would pay approximately the same rent."
15.

No cottage site has been leased following a public auction during the period since

the 1990 Act became effective on March 29, 1990 because all lease transfers have been affected
through sale and assignment by the then-existing lessee to the new lessee. See Idaho Admin. R.
20.03.13.020.

E.

LAND BOARD IMPLEMENTATION OF IDAHO CODE § 58-3 lOA
] 6.

The passage ofIdaho Code § 58-31OA prompted the Board to reexamine its rental

policies to comply with the new statutory requirement to obtain market rent.

Real Estate

Consultants recommended a variable rate of return tied to lot values, with rates of 4.5% to 5.5%;
but the Land Board not only continued the then-present Board policy of phasing in a 2.5% rental
rate, it further restricted the phase-in rate to 5.3% annually, despite being advised by IDL staff
that a phase-in rate of 5.3% annually would not achieve the target of 2.5% of land value
"because land values-and target rentals-are rising faster than 5.3% annually."
17.

By 1997, the disparity between the rapid rise in market value and the 5.3% annual

cap on rent increases had reduced the actual rate of return to 1%. IDL staff recommended that
rents be raised over a five year period to achieve a return of 5% of property value. The Land
Board, after hearing the concerns of lessees, once again rejected staff recommendations to raise
the rent and instead affirmed the 2.5% rental rate "with the understanding that it can be reopened
based on incoming information."
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] 8.

Outside experts subsequently were again consulted, and again such experts

recommended substantial rental increases to at least 3.5% of property value for Priest Lake
cottage sites and at least 4% of property value for Payette Lake cottage sites. Once again, both
the outside experts and rDL staff emphasized that the presence of large leasehold values was
clear evidence that contract rents were below market rents. Nonetheless, the Land Board again
adopted a rental rate of 2.5% with the justification that such a rate "recognizes and takes into
consideration the lessees sweat equity and site improvements."
] 9.

The annual rental rate has remained ostensibly at 2.5% Slfice ] 998, but real

returns have at times fallen below 2.5% due to freezes on valuation of cottage sites in the face of
rapidly rising land values. In recent years leasehold values, and profits enjoyed by lessees upon
assignment of leases, have continued to increase, thus demonstrating the Land Board's failure to
obtain market rent. Since 2003. cottage site owners have realized in excess of $25 million from
the sale of leaseholds. Over four of the last seven years, the amount of money received by
lessees for the conveyance of leaseholds exceeded the total rent received by the Board on behalf
of endowment beneficiaries. For example, in 2006, nine lessees received $6,482,709 for the
conveyance of leaseholds.

That same year, the total amount of annual and premium rent

received by the Board for all 522 cottage sites was $4,022,676.

F.

2007 COTTAGE SITE RENTAL FOR\1ULA SUBCOMMITTEE
20.

(a)

In 2007, the Board appointed two Board members - Secretary of State

Ben Ysursa and Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna - to form a subcommittee to
recommend a rental formula to be applied to the cottage sites during the lease term that starts
January I, 20 II. Over the next several years, the subcommittee held a series of meetings with
lessees to hear their concerns and to evaluate alternative methods of calculating rents.

The

members of the subcommittee expressed the desire to work on a "collaborative basis" with the
lessees to establish a mutually-agreeable rent.

Board member Luna described the

subcommittee's mission as an opportunity "to meet our obligation on the Land Board to bring
some stability ... to these cottage site leases, and, you know, for those who own the leases."
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Board member Ysursa stated he was "very sympathetic to the plight of the cottage site owners as
far as predictability and stability as far as these rapid escalation of rents."
(b)

When the Board met on February \6, 2010 to detennine rental rates for

2011, the subcommittee presented a report with the following recommendation: "[A J target
annual lease rent ('target rent') will be calculated at 4.0% of the average appraised value of each
lot over the most recent 10 years (the sum of the 10 prior years appraised or indexed values for
each lot divided by to). Actual rent will increase or decrease annually from the prior year's rent
at a constant percentage rate to reach the target rent in year five. Every five years from the
efTective date of the lease, the actual rent will be recalculated using this same methodology and
appraised values of the lot for the most recent 10 years. Lot values shall be appraised by the
applicable county assessor or detennined by an Idaho Certified Appraiser, at the discretion of the
Department. At the end of the (sic) each five year period under the lease, the target rent will be
calculated at 4.0% of the average value for the duration of the lease."
(c)

The subcommittee's rationale for its recommendations was that "severely

impairing or eroding longstanding business relationships with our lessees is not in the best
interest of our trust beneficiaries" and the fact that fluctuations in rent "cause[J concern for cabin
site lessees." The subcommittee report expressed the concern that "raising rents too high would
result in these lands going unleased, to the detriment of beneficiaries."

In presenting the

subcommittee report to the Board, however, subcommittee member Ysursa described the process
as "balancing our constitutional mandate in article 9, section 8, prudent investor standards,
whatever you want to say, with the long-tenn relationship we have with the lessees."

G.

RESPONSE TO AND BOARD ACTION ON SUBCOMMITTEE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDA TIONS
21.

The subcommittee's report and recommendations were addressed by both IDL

staff and outside consultants retained by the Attorney General in his capacity as a Land Board
member.
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(a)

roL

Director George Bacon concluded that while the target rate would be

4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would vary
between 2.37% and 2.43% ifland appreciated at 4.8% annually. If land were to appreciate at an
annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further
concluded: HI do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease. but neither does the current system."
Director Bacon also examined recent leasehold sales, which indicated that the contract rate of
2.5% of current assessed or appraised value that was in effect in recent years was below market
value. In 2008 and 2009, two "down" years in the real estate market, 2] leaseholds sold for
$6,392,039, an average of over $300,000 per leasehold. Director Bacon stated: "[bJased on the
numerous studies previously commissioned and conducted by real estate experts, it appears as
long as there is leasehold value, the rent charged is not at market."
(b)

In 2010, Attorney General Wasden commissioned two economists to

independently examine the issue of market rent generally and to determine whether the
subcommittee recommendation would achieve market rent and fulfill the Board's duty to
maximize the long term financial return for endowment beneficiaries.

The economists

concluded that the subcommittee recommendation would not fulfill the Board's duty to
maximize the long term financial return for the endowment beneficiaries.

They found

particularly troubling the subcommittee's proposal to "smooth" rent increases by using both a ten
year rolling average to establish lot values and a five year phase-in to reach the rent based on
such ten-year average value, since it "guarantees that the state is not securing market rent for the
five year adjustment period." The economists also concluded that the proposal to gradually
increase premium rent until it reaches 50% of leasehold value "validates that the board has not
been charging market rents, that below market rents have contributed to leasehold values, and
that the state has been missing out on revenues that a prudent investor would have captured." In
response to questioning from a Board member at its meeting on February 16, 2010, one of the
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economists emphasized that the combination of rolling average and phased-in target rent would
"hamstring the Board in meeting its fiduciary responsibility" to obtain market rent.
22.

Three of the five Board members have explicitly acknowledged on the record that

the rents to be imposed over the next ten-year rental term are below the market rental rate. Two
of those Board members voted in opposition to the rental scheme. One Board member, despite
conceding that the 4% rental rate, when combined with the subcommittee's recommended
"smoothing effect" resulted in rents "quite a ways away from market rent," nonetheless voted in
favor of such rent.

Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, the Land Board voted 3-2 at its

March 16, 2010 meeting to adopt the phased-in annual rental rate and a modified premium rent
consisting of the greater of 10% of gross leasehold value or 50% of net leasehold value.

H.

FAILURE TO SECURE CONSTITUTIONALLY AND/OR STATUTORILY
REQUIRED FINANCIAL RETURNS
23.

[n sum, despite unequivocal evidence from leasehold sales and other indicators

that contract rents are below market rate, the Land Board continues to ignore its constitutionallyimposed obligation to trust beneficiaries to secure maximum long term financial returns. The
leases that will be distributed to cottage site lessees for the ten year lease term beginning January
I, 20 I], adopt a nominal target rate of 4% of property value, but such rate is to be phased in over
a five year period, and the property value upon which the rate is based is not current market
value, but the average market value for the years 2001 through 2010. After five years the cycle
is repeated, with rent to be based on average property values from 2005-20 IS, to be phased in
over five years. As a result, IDL Director George Bacon concluded that while the target rate
would be 4%, the effective rental rate (actual rent returns compared to current land value) would
vary between 2.37% and 2.43% if land appreciated at 4.8% annually. If land were to appreciate
at an annual rate of 10.30%, the effective rental rate would stabilize at around 1.54%. He further
concluded: "1 do not believe the Subcommittee's recommendation insures that each leased lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease, but neither does the current system."
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24.

The Land Board also continues to impose premium rent, widely acknowledged as

an implicit admission that leasehold values will continue to accrue because contract rent is below
market rent. For the next rental term, the trusts' beneficiaries will not receive the money they
would receive if the Board were getting market rent for the leases, as constitutionally and
statutorily required. Members of the Board have acknowledged that the rents imposed by the
Board are not based solely on their duty to maximize income for trust beneficiaries, but rather
are the result of their desire to work on a "collaborative basis" with the lessees to establish a
mutually-agreeable rent and their desire to "bring some stability ... to these cottage site leases,
and, you know, for those who own the leases."

One Board member stated he was "very

sympathetic to the plight of the cottage site owners as far as predictability and stability as far as
these rapid escalation of rents," and described the process as "balancing our constitutional
mandate in article 9, section 8, prudent investor standards, whatever you want to say, with the
long-term relationship we have with the lessees."
I.

CURRENT COTTAGE LEASE STATUS
25.

Under its cottage-site leasing practices, the Land Board, acting through the JDL,

issued ten-year leases to renewing lessees for the periods of 1992-2000 and 200] -2010. It has
directed Defendant Bacon to prepare ten-year leases for execution by those existing lessees
desiring to renew for the 2011-2020 period, but such leases have not been executed by Defendant
Bacon or co-signed by the Land Board's president.

The period for making application for

renewal leases has expired, and, as of the date of this Complaint, many, if not all, of the existing
lessees have submitted timely and otherwise valid applications to IDL.

Upon the Attorney

General's information and belief, Defendant Bacon will forward the renewal leases to existing
lessees on or before December 6, 2010.
I.

IDAHO SUPREME COURT OPINION
26.

On December 1,2010, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wasden ex

reI. State v. Idaho Stale Board of Land Commissioners, No. 37528 (Idaho S. Ct.), dismissing a
petition for wTit of prohibition tiled by Attorney General Wasden and directed exclusively to the
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Land Board's noncompliance with the "maximum long-term financial return" requirement in
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution. Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land

Comm'rs, 2010 Idaho No. ]28,2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1,2010). The basis for the dismissal
was the availability of a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law-i.e., injunctive relief under
I.R.C.P. 65. The Court nevertheless discussed various background facts and stated in part:
(a)

"As leasehold values grew it became clear to the Board that it was not

achieving market rent, and in 1981 the Board invented the concept of 'premium rent' to try to
decrease the amount of profit the Lessees were reaping from the gap between actual and market
rent. The term 'premium rent' is a misnomer; it would be more accurate to refer to this
mechanism as a 'leasehold transfer fee.' Premium rent requires that the lessee pay the State a
certain percentage of the value that the lessee receives from selling his leasehold interest in a
cottage site.

In 1981 this percentage was set at 10%. So, for example, if a lessee sold his

leasehold for $160,000 and had placed $60,000 of improvements and personal property on the
land, the leasehold value would be $ 100,000. Of that $100,000 the State would be entitled to

$10,000 and the remaining $90,000 would go to the selling lessee. Premium rent was conceived
of as a temporary measure, the utility and impact of which would disappear as rents reached fair
market value. In fact the IDAPA provision establishing premium rent~IDAPA 20.03.13.027reproduced above, expired on December 31, 1992.
contjnued to apply premium rent to leasehold sales."

Nevertheless the Board and IDL have

2010 WL 4861713, at *3 (footnote

omitted).
(b)
pursuant to

I.e.

"From 1905 until 1991 the cottage sites were subject to conflict auctions

§ 58-310, and its statutory predecessors. Idaho Code § 58-310 provides that,

when a lease term expires and more than one party makes application to lease the property, an
auction is held amongst the applying parties to determine which is willing to pay the most to
lease the property. Despite having been subject to this provision, no conflict auction had been
carried out on a cottage site until 1990.

It is likely that this apparent lack of interest was

attributable to lack of public awareness, largely due to the fact that the Board had a policy
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against advertising when cottage leases were expiring, and posted notices of availability only on
the local court house bulletin board. In 1990 the Board received conflicting applications for two
different cottage sites, where both the existing lessees and an outside party applied to lease.
Instead of holding a contlict auction as

I.e. § 58-310 required, IDL requested that the legislature

draft legislation exempting cottage sites from I.C. § 58-310. As a result, I.C. § 58-310A was
passed, eliminating conflict auctions as a means of establishing the maximum long-term
financial return and instead requiring that the Board ensure that the cottage leases generate
market rent throughout their duration." Id.
(c)

"By 1997, leasehold values had escalated sharply and for some cottage

sites the local property taxes actually exceeded the rent IDL was collecting from the Lessees.
The escalating property value, coupled with the 5.3% cap on rent increases from year-to-year,
meant that the return on the cottage sites was only slightly higher than it had been in 1986, at
1%. IDL concluded that it was quite apparent thllt the rent being collected under the cottage

leases was below market rent. IDL concluded that all available market data suggested that
market rent would be somewhere between 3% and 5%, noting that most data supported a 5%
rate. IDL concluded that the Board would not be complying with its constitutional duty if it
continued with its existing rental formula. The Board nonetheless voted to continue the 2.5%
rate, though it did create a new target rent based on the most recent property assessment-to be
updated on an annual basis-eliminated the phase-in period, and removed the yearly cap on rent
increases." 2010 WL 4861713, at "'4 (footnotes omitted).
(d)

"The [2007] Cottage Site Subcommittee recommended a new lease

structure with annual rent set at 4% of average market value of each cottage site over the
previous 10 years, to be updated annually (the so-called 'rolling average'). However, the 4%
rolling average would not be reached until the. en,dof a 5-year phase-in period during which rent
would be incrementally increased from its current level to the target rent. The new cottage leases
would also include premium rent, though under a more complicated formula than that previously
employed. The Cottage Site Subcommittee recommended that 'premium rent be calculated at
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.
10% of the gross leasehold value or 50% of the net leasehold value, whichever is the greater
amount for the endowment.'

The Cottage Site Subcommittee explained that '[ n]et leasehold

value shall be calculated by subtracting the original leasehold value (sales price less the value of
tenant improvements) of the lessee who is transferring the lease from the leasehold value (sale
price less the value of tenant improvements) when a transfer occurs.' It was clarified during a
regular Board meeting that the Cottage Site Subcommittee was recommending the 50% net
leasehold premium rent be phased in over a period of 5 years." 2010 WL 4861713, at *5.
(e)

"The Director of lDL analyzed the

Cottage Site Subcommittee

recommendations and determined that the rolling average system of determining rental rates
would result in actual return being approximately 2.4% assuming land value appreciates at 4.8%

a year, or 1.5% if land appreciates at 10.3% annually. The Director concluded '1 do not believe
the Subcommittee's recommendation ensures that each leased lot generates market rent
throughout the duration of the lease, but neither does the current system.' On March 16, 20 10,
the Board voted 3-2 for the new lease structure as recommended by the Cottage Site
Subcommittee." Jd.

(t)

"The determination of 'market rent'

is fundamental1y a

factual

determination although the statements of three-fifths of the membership of the Land Board do
indicate that the leases in question do not achieve the level of market rent." 20 I0 WL 4861713,
at *8.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
27.

The allegations in paragraphs] through 26 above are incorporated by reference.

28.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution requires, in relevant part, the

Legislature, "at the earliest practicable period, [to] provide by law that the general grants ofland
made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in
trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for
which said grants of land were made." The State acquired the cottage sites pursuant to such a
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"general grant[] of land" from Congress, and the term "disposal" includes, inter alia, the leasing
of such sites.
29.

The exclusion of cottage site leases from the contlict auction provisions in Idaho

Code § 58·110(2) in the 1990 Act violates the limitation on legislative authority under Article
IX, Section 8 and is void.
30.

The operation of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA(3) is integrally-related and indispensable

to the operation of Idaho Code § 58-310A(2). The 1990 Act also contained no severability
provision. Because the operative provisions of the 1990 Act are not severable, the entirety of
Idaho Code § 58·31 OA is null and void, and the statute confers no lawful authority on the Land
Board or Defendant Bacon, so that all actions of the Land Board implementing cottage site rents
pursuant to the terms of § 58-3] OA are null and void.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
3].

The aJlegations of paragraphs 1 through 30 are incorporated by reference.

32.

The Land Board's actions described above, and most recently those at its March

16, 20 I 0 meeting, violate the obligation imposed under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution to "secure the maximum long term financial return" to endowment land
beneficiaries.

In particular, the rental rate set pursuant to authority ostensibly granted under

Idaho Code § 58-310A is substantially below the "maximum long term financial return"
constitutionally mandated-a fact that a majority of the Board recognized in approving the most
recent rental-rate fonnula.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
33.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 32 are incorporated by reference.

34.

Alternatively, in the event this Court concludes that Idaho Code § 58-3 lOA is

constitutional, the Land Board's actions described above, including, but not limited to, its
utilization of phase-in periods for rental increases to mitigate perceived hardships on lessees,
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violate the obligation imposed under Idaho Code § 58-31 OA to secure market rent throughout the
duration of each lease term.

RELIEF REQUESTED
33.

A declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 to -

12] 7 that Idaho Code § 58-3] OA conflicts with, and therefore is rendered void by, the public
auction requirement in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and that no substantive
provision in Idaho Code § 58-3] OA can be given effect.
34.

A declaratory judgment that the Land Board and Defendant Bacon possess no

authority by virtue of [daho Code § 58-310A to enter into cottage site renewal leases for the
2011-2020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and -310.
35.

A declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-120] to -

1217 that the current formula for determining cottage-site rental rates fails to "secure the
maximum long term financial return" as required by Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution.
36.

Alternatively, if Idaho Code § 58-310A is found to be constitutional, a

declaratory judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 57 and Idaho Code §§ 10-120 I to -1217 that the
current formula for determining and implementing cottage-site rental rates fails to secure market
rent throughout the duration of each lease term.
37.

Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 65 against the

Land Board and Director Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 20112020 period without compliance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 and -310.
38.

Alternatively, if Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is found to be constitutional, preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 against the Land Board and Director
Bacon to prevent entry into cottage site renewal leases for the 2011-2020 period without
compliance with the mandate in Idaho Code §§ 58-31 OA to secure market rent throughout the
duration of each lease term.
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39.

Such other and further relief as deemed appropriate by this Court.

DATED this 2nd day of December 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN

L. OLSEN

Deputy Attorney General
Chief of Civil Litigation Division

By~;rJj--+L=VlL_____
~. _
CLA Y

R.

SMITH

Deputy Attorney General
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L. OLSEN, ISB No. 3586

Chief, Civil Litigation Di vision

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
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R. SMITH, ISB. No. 6385
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LA WRENCE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON,

)

in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands

)

Defendants.

c.;v:-..10.OC
1023751
_ _ _ __
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

)

)
)

Plaintiff Lawrence A. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, hereby
requests entry of a preliminary injunction pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 65(e) enjoining (I) Defendant

Bacon from presenting to Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners for its consideration
and execution 2011·2020 leases for state endowment lands, known as "cottage sites," proximate
to Payette and Priest Lakes and (2) Defendant Bacon and the president of Defendant State Board

of Land Commissioners from executing such leases if presented.
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AND AS GROUNDS THEREFOR states preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate
under sub-paragraph (1) of I.R.C.P. 65(e) because the Attorney General ,jis entitled to the relief
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually." The grounds
for this motion are set out more specifically in the supporting brief filed simultaneously
herewith.
WHEREFORE, the Attorney General respectfully requests that the preliminary injunctive
relief sought be granted.

Dated this 2nd day of December. 2010.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
A TTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN
Deputy Attorney Genera.l
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
·'1

l

k!3£

']

::-~
BY __ ____________________
___
~~

CLAY

R. SMITH

Deputy Attomey General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
"?~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of December 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

o U.S. Mail
o Hand Delivery
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested

o Overnight MaiJ
o Facsimile: (208) 746·0753

o Email: mclark@hawlevtroxeLl.com

CLAY
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STEVEN 1. OLSEN, ISB No. 3586

J, DAV'D NAVARRO. Clerk

Chief of Civil Litigation Division

By eARLY LATIMORe
DEPUTY

R. SMITH, ISB No. 6385
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2 nd Floor

CLA Y

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, CD 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Fax: (208) 854-8073
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN' THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWREl\CE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General ofIdaho, ex reI.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARIES,

)
)
)

No. - - - - -

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

VS.

)

STATE BOARD OF LAND

COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON,
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands
Defendants.

CV OC 10237511 \

BRIEF II\' SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIO~

)
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
The Attorney General has initiated this action, in part, to resolve the conflict between

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 58-31OA The constitutional
provision requires all lands held in trust by the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land

Board" or "Board") for the benefit of various public entities--{;ommonly referred to as

endo\\oment lands-to be disposed of through public auction. The public auction requiremc:nt
complements the Land Board's attendant obligation to secure the maximum long-tenn return for
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the beneficiaries from, inter alia. the sale or leasing of the endowment lands. The Legislature,
however, eliminated the public auction requirement when it adopted 1990 Idaho Session Laws
chapter 187, now codified at Idaho Code § 58-3\ OA (" 1990 Ace).
As the State of Idaho's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General has an
obligation to defend, where possible, the validity of legislative actions as part and parcel of
representing the State's officers and entities. See Idaho Code § 67-1401(1). He is charged also
~;th

supervising "nonprofit corporations, corporations, charitable or benevolent societies, person

or persons holding property subject to any public or charitable trust and . ..

enforc[ing)

whenever necessary any noncompliance or departure from the general purpose of such trust." ld.
§ 67-1401(5). As an ordinary matter, discharging both of these duties simultaneously causes no
difficulty because faithful adherence to, and enforcement of, state statutes often forms the
predicate for carrying out the responsibilities assigned by § 67-1401(5).
This is, however, the unusual situation. The Legislature departed from the public auction

mandate in Article IX, Section 8 with regard to the leasing of cottage sites located on endowment
lands. By ignoring the Constitution's unequivocal direction, the 1990 Act interfered with at least
one purpose of the public auction requirement: to use the give-and-take of the free market as a
mechanism for securing maximum long-term financial return for the endowment land
beneficiaries.

The Legislature recognized the vacuum left through elimination of the public

auction requirement by imposing on Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land
Board") the difficult task of administratively establishing "market rent." What is at issue for
purposes of the present motion is not whether the Land Board has carried out that task
adequately-the subject matter of the second claim for relief in the complaint-but whether the
involved beneficiaries are entitled to the bargain struck by the Constitution's drafters requiring
the endowment land leases to be subject to public auction. I They are, and the 1990 Act plainly
I The second claim for relief challenges the rental rate fonnula established at the Land Board's March 16.
2010 meeting-a rate which perpetuated a long history of leasing the endowment lands at issue here for
amounts that have not secured to those lands' beneficiaries the "maximum long term financial return,"
The subject matter of the second claim was before the Supreme Court in Wasden ex ret. Stare v. Idaho
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violates the bargain, as the Attorney General recently concluded in Attorney General Opinion
09-1. See Strack Affd, Ex. 2 ..

The preliminary injunction, if granted, will do nothing more than preserve the status quo
during the pendency of this Jitigation. The Attorney General asks nothing more than that the
Defendants be precluded from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases until the
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA has been resolved. That issue is narrow, purely legal
in character, and capable of expeditious resolution through motions under IRep 12 or 56. The
Attorney General does not seek relief that would restrain the Land Board from taking appropriate
action to extend existing leases pending final resolution of the challenge to § 58-31 OA's
constitutionality.

RELEVANT FACTS
The Idaho Constitution, Art. [X, § 8, required the Legislature, "at the earliest practicable
period, [to] provide by law that the general grants ofland made by congress to the state shall be
judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction
for the use and benefit of the respective object for v·,rhich said grants of land were made." Article
IX, Section 8, although variously modified since t 890, remains unchanged as to its public
auction requirement and sets the controlling limits on legislative authority with regard to
endowment land "disposal."
One category of state endowment lands is land proximate to Payette and Priest Lakes.
This land, in tum, has been administered over time as myriad parcels-the "cottage sites"-for
leasing purposes. See Strack Aff., Ex. 3, at 6 ("2008 PAG Report,,).2 Currently, 167 cottage site
State Board of Land CommIssioners, :\0. 37528 (Idaho S. Ct.), in the context of a petition for writ of
prohibition. The petition was dismissed on December I, 2010, because of availability ofa plain, adequate
and speedy remedy at law--i.e., injunctive relief under I.R.C.P. 65. See Wasden ex reI. Stale v. Idaho
Siale Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 2010 Idaho No. 128, 2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1, 201 0). See AlT. of Steven
W. Strack (,'Strack A ff."), Ex. I. The third claim for relief is pled in the alternative if this Court
concludes that § 58-31 OA does not ,,'iolate Article IX, Section 8 and alleges that the rental rate established
for the cottage site leaseholds at the Board's March 16,2010 meeting does not comply with the "market
rent" requirement in subsection (l)(h) of the statute.
2 The 2008 PAG Report. formally titled Analysis of Proceduresfor Residential Real Esla/e (Cottage Site)
Leases on Idaho Endowment Lands, was prepared at Secretary of State Ysursa's request by Philip S.
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leases are associated with Payette Lake and 355 leases with Priest Lake. /d. All leases have tenyear durations and expire on December 31, 2010.

Id. The deadline for, inter alia, existing

lessees to make application for successor leases was April 30, 2010 (Idaho Code § 58-307(8)
but was extended by IDL to June 18,2010. In anticipation of the leases' expiration, the Board
directed Defendant Bacon at its March 2010 meeting to prepare a successor ten-year lease
template.)

Vpon informalion and belief, Defendant Bacon is anticipated to forward the form

leases to existing lessees on or before December 6, 2010.

Formal entry into the leases will

require execution by Defendant Bacon and the Governor, who serves as Land Board president,
after their execution by the affected lessee. Idaho Code § 58-121.

ARGUMENT
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE COTT AGE SITES'
LEASING IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC Al'CTION REQUIREMENT IN ARTICLE
IX, SECTION 8 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION, AND THE PRELIMINARY
lNJUNCTION SOUGHT WILL PREVENT THE DEFENDANTS FROM ENTERING
INTO LEASES WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH IDAHO CODE §§ 58-307 THROUGH
-310

I.

Section 58-310A Violates The Idaho Constitution Under long-S.anding And
Recently-Reaffirmed Authority
Rule 65(e)(1), IRCP, authorizes a district court to grant a preliminary injunction "[w]hen

it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or
any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained ot~
either for a limited period or perpetually."

The Supreme Court has counseled that "[tJhe

substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that appellant[s] are entitled to the
relief they demanded [under Rule 65(e}(I)] cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact
exist which are not free from doubt." Harris v. Cassia County. 106 Idabo 513, 518, 681 P.2d

Cook and Jay O'Laughlin on behalf of the Policy Analysis Group, College of l\atural Resources.
University of Idaho, for use by the Land Board in its cottage site-related deliberations.
3 Section 58-307, Idaho Code, was amended in 2008 to allow certain lands, including residential cottage
sites, to be leased for periods up to 3S years. 2008 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 103 (codified at Idaho Code § 5&307(3». The Land Board nevertheless opted to maintain the ten-year period.
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988, 993 (1984). This matter, in contrast to Harris, involves an otherwise settled issue of law
and a straightforward set of largely, ifnot entirely, undisputed facts.
The application of the public auction requirement to endowment land leasing has dra~n
the Supreme Court's attention since the early part of the last century. The most recent treatment
of this issue, as explained in Attorney General Opinion 09-01 at 8-10, was undertaken in a series
of decisions rendered in response to litigation initiated by the Idaho Watersheds Project ("IWP").

/WP v. Stale Board, ]28 Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996) ("IWP I"); fWP v. State Bd.,
133 Idaho 55, 982 P.2d 358 (1999) ("JWP II"); IWP v. State Bd., 133 Idaho 64, 982 P.2d 367

(1999) ("fWP HI"); lWP v. State Board, 133 Idaho 68,982 P.2d 371 (l999) ("IWP IV"). In IWP
I, the Court found the Board to have acted ultra vires when it issued a lease to an applicant that
had failed to bid in a conflict auction held pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-310:
The Board must find authority in the constitution and stalutes for its actions ..
. . No such authority exists to support the Board's act of granting the lease to a person
who did not place a bid at the conflict auction. Idaho Code § 58-310 requires an
auction be held where, as in thjs case, there are two persons who have applied to lease
the same state school land .... The rationale behind the requirement of conducting an
"auction" is to solicit competing bids, v.ith the lease being granted to the bid that
would, in the discretion of the Board, "secure the maximum long term financial
return" to Idaho's schools .... The Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease
to an applicant who does not place a bid at an auction, based upon Idaho's
constitutional and statutory mandate that the Board conduct an auction. Idaho Const.
art. IX, § 8; I.C. § 58-310.
128 Idaho at 766,918 P.2d at 1211 (some citations omitted). Although the Supreme Court held
that the Land Board's leasing determination yiolated statutory directives, the Court also
expressly relied on Article IX, Section 8's public auction mandate as a co-equal basis for its
holding.
The 1999 IWP trilogy followed suit.

The IWP II Court sustained, on a procedural

grounds, a challenge to a voter-approved constitutional amendment that, in part, would have
modified Article IX, Section 8 "[t}o change the word disposal to sale in reference to the
disposition of certain lands." 133 Idaho at 57, 982 P.2d at 360. The modification implicitly
recognized that the term "disposal" in the constitutional provision extended beyond "sale" of
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endo'hment land since, absent such a meaning, no need existed for the amendment itself. See,
e.g., Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature, ]42 Idaho 640, 643, 132 P.3d 397, 401 (2006)

("[ w]e should avoid an interpretation which would render terms of a constitution surplusage").
The Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-310B in IWP III under Article IX, Section 8 because it
attempted "to provide income to the schools and the state in general" and, in so doing, violated
the constitutional mandate to "'provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress

to the state shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to
disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grams of
land were made.'"

133 Idaho at 67, 982 P.2d at 370 (emphasis added by court).

It then

invalidated disqualification of IWP's lease application given the Land Board's reliance on
otherwise impemlissible factors identified in § 58-31OB. 133 Idaho at 67-68, 982 P.2d at 370-

71. The Court gave similar effect to § 58-31 OB' s invalidity in IWP IV where, again, the Board
had disqualified IWP's lease application.

133 Idaho at 71, 982 P.2d at 374.

The common

denominator in the lWP decisions, therefore, was the inclusion of endowment land leases within
the scope of the term "disposal" as used in Article IX, Section 8.

4

In so construing "disposal," the Supreme Court was not writing upon a clean slate. It
instead was adhering to an understanding of Article ]X, Section 8 first announced in Tobey v.

4

The /WP trilogy is instructive concerning another constitutionally suspect feature of Idaho Code § 58-

310A: The legislative findings reflecting that the 1990 Act resulted in part from the fact that, "in the case
of single family, recreational cottage site and homesite leases, the conflict application and auction
procedure have (sic} caused considerable consternation and dismay to the existing lessee at the prospect
of losing a long-time lease." [d. § 58-31 OA( 1)( e). The Supreme Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-31 OB
because it impennissibly directed the Land Board to consider interests other than the endowment land
beneficiaries in making leasing determinations; so, too, § 58-310A retlects the Legislature's
detennination to ameliorate existing lessees' "consternation and dismay" by removing the market force
mechanism implicit in a public auction and substituting the Land Board's market rent assessment. Article
IX, Section 8 requires the Legislature, not less than the Board. to act with undivided loyalty to the

beneficiaries in making "maximum long tenn financial return" assessments, but the 1990 Act plainly was
motivated by a desire to confer a benefit-the elimination of lease contlictors--on existing lessees. This
additional ground for § 58-31 OA 's invalidation nevertheless need not be reached to resolve the first claim
for relief because, even had the Legislature exercised unalloyed loyalty, it could not ignore the public
auction mandate.
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Bridgewood, 22 Idaho 566,127 P. 178 (1912). There, the Court considered a quiet title action

involving application of a statute, now codified in Idaho Code § 58-601 without substantive
amendment, that authorized the Land Board to issue a right-of-way to any person "desiring to
construct over or upon any of the lands ov-ned or controlled by the state of Idaho, any ditch,
canal, reservoir or other works for carrying or distributing public waters for any beneficial use."
The statute, as originally adopted in ] 90 1 (1901 Idaho Sess. L. p. 191, § 8), required no
compensation for such rights-of-way but was amended in 1907 to impose a $10 per acre
minimum (1907 Idaho Sess. L. p. 527, § 1). [t did not require a public auction as a condition to
the right-of-way's interest.

The plaintiff in Tobey had acquired certain lands for reservoir

purposes from the Land Board in 1909 by payment of the statutory minimum and compliance
with certain other requirements after being directed by the Board to comply with the statutc.
The Supreme Court used the dispute to discuss the breadth of the Land Board's authority
under Article IX, Section 8 and the Legislature's authority under the Idaho Constitution's

eminent domain provision, Article I, Section 14. The Court criticized the Board at the outset for
requiring the plaintiff to follow the right-of-way statute because "an agreement and contract
between [him] and [it] was made which cannot be construed as a lease of state land, neither is it
the purchase of state land at public auction, under the provisions of the Constitution and the laws
of the state, but is wholly without authority of law or legal sanction or authority, and violatcd
specifically the inhibition as to the authority of tbe [Board] contained in the Constitution and the
statutes." 22 Idaho at 580, 127 P. at 183 (emphasis added).
However, the Court did not find the statute itself unconstitutional because it, along with a
companion provision now codified at Idaho Code § 58-602 providing for the withholding of
lands from sale when the Land Board concludes that their highest value is reservoir use, "in no
way confer upon the [Board] any power that is prohibited by the Constitution, and it was not the
intention of the Legislature in enacting said sections to in any way contravene the constitutional
inhibition. but it was intended to carry out the provi sions found in sec. 14 of art. I of the
constitution." 22 Idaho at 58l-82, 127 P. at 183. It then quoted the predecessor provision to
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§ 58-603 for the apparent proposition that it exemplified the same use of eminent domajn
authority. 22 Idaho at 582-83, 127

~.

at 184 ..The Court continued on to reiterate that the two

reservo ir-related statutes
were not intended to provide for a method or system of disposing of land
belonging to the state which will have the effect of granting the right to the use or
occupancy forever, or the right to enter upon state land or occupy it for the
purpose of use as a reservoir on in appropriating water thereon, except that such
right and use and occupancy is obtained under the provision of the Constitution
and the statutory laws of the state.
22 Idaho at 583, 127 P. at 184. The Court concluded by pointing to two statutes-now codified
at Idaho Code §§ 7-703 and 42-1104, which in the first instance, identify state property as
subject to taking by eminent domain and, in the other, allow the taking of state property for the
purpose constructing rights-of-way "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining any ditch,
canal, conduit or other works for the diversion or carrying of water for any beneficial use"-as
"show[ingJ clead)' the intent of the Legislature to grant the right to take state land for a public

use, just the same as private property." 22 Idaho at 585, 127 P. at 185. The Board's action, in
other words, was not consistent with Article IX, Section 8 but was authorized under Article l,
Section 14.

Tobey thus left no doubt that Article IX, Section 8, insofar as it relates to the disposition
of endowment lands, applies to the sale or rental of school trust lands but did not restrict the
Legislature's constitutionally-independent power to enact eminent domain laws. The Supreme
Court returned to the same jssue several years later in Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co. v.

Fisher, 27 Idaho 695, 151 P. 998 (1915), another quiet titJe aCIion. The plaintiff there acquired a
right-of-way in 1903 for purposes of constructing a reservoir under the same statute as the
plaintiff in Tobey and had completed construction on two of the three anticipated facilities by
1912 when the defendant acquired the same land from the State after a public auction.
Chief Justice Sullivan, the only remaining member of the Tobey Court, wrote the
principal opinion reversing the district court's judgment in the defendant's favor. His opinion
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focused on the potential conflict between Article lX, Section 8 and the eminent domain provision
in Article I, Section 14. It sought to reconcile the two constitutional sections and did so by
restricting each provision's scope. The opinion devoted virtually all of its substantive analysis to
Article I, Section 14 and the related eminent domain statute and held that "under the provisions
of the Constitution which clearly contemplates the subjection of state lands to certain public
uses, the title in fee does not pass to the condemnor under the eminent domain or other
proceedings provided by the Legislature for the subjection of state lands to public uses."
27 Idaho at 704, 151 P. at 1001; see also 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. at 1002 (under Article I, Section
14 "only the necessary use of the land for reservoir or dam purposes is taken which may result in
the perpetual use of such lands for that purpose, or only a temporary use, and the title in fee to
the land remains in the state"). It further reasoned that "[b]y holding that [the] provisions of

fArticle IX,) Section 8 are applicable when the state parts with the fee, and not where it grants an
easement, the sections of the Constitution in regard to the sale of school lands and of eminent

domain can be made effective and harmonious." 27 Idaho at 705,151 P. at 1001. The principal
opinion addressed Tobey quite briefly. It characterized the earlier decision as having "proceeded
upon the theory that the fee-simple title was taken or disposed of by the state for the public use
therein mentioned" but nevertheless overruled "the doctrine therein ... that is contrary to the
views expressed in this opinion." 27 Idaho at 709,151 P. at 1002.
Justice Morgan concurred in the principal opinion but solely "upon the ground that [the
involved right-of-way statute] provides only for taking an easement or right of way upon or
across schoo] Jands" rather than "for the sale or leasing of such lands" and thus did not
contravene Article IX, Section 8. 27 Idaho at 709, 151 P. 1002 (emphasis added). Justice Budge
dissented, reasoning that "the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any law which provides for
the disposition of lands granted to the state by an act of Congress in any manner than as
expressly provided in the Act of Admission and in the

Constitution~

that is, by sale at public

auction." 27 Idaho at 719, 151 P. at 1006. The dissenting opinion additionally disagreed with
the proposition that only an easement had been granted; instead, "[t]be taking of the state land in
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question for reservoir purposes is, in effect and under [the eminent domain] statute, the acquiring
of a fee-simple title to said Jands." 27 Idaho at 720, 151 P. at 1006. Consequently, all Justices
participating in Idaho-iowa Lateral agreed that, where the sale or leasing of endowment lands
occurs and eminent domain authority has not been exercised, the public auction strictures in
Article IX, Section 8 apply.
The Supreme Court returned to the public auction requirement subsequently in East Side

Blaine County Live Slack Association v. Stare Board, 34 Idaho 807, ]98 P.760 (1921). There,
the Court affirmed issuance of mandamus relief against the Land Board for failing to hold a
public auction over a lease of state lands. It reasoned in part that
The dominant purpose of these provisions of the Constitution and of the
statutes enacted thereunder is that the state shall receive the greatest possible
amount for the lease of schoo! lands for the benefit of school funds, and for this
reason competitive bidding is made mandatory. . . . The provisions of the
Constitution and lleasing] statutes above referred to made it the duty of the State
Board of Land Commissioners, under the facts and circumstances of this case, to
offer the lease of said lands at auction to the highest bidder, and the Board, in
refusing to do so, failed in the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a
duty resulting from its official position. In refusing to do so, its action ran counter
to the provisions of the Constitution and statutes.
34 Idaho at 814-15, 198 P. at 763. The IWP I Court concisely summarized issue in East Side as
"whether school land leases had to be offered at a public auction, pursuant to Idaho's
constitutional and statutory mandate[,]" and as holding "that state lands are be 'leased at public
auction to the highest bidder therefore.''' 128 Idaho at 764, 918 P.2d at 1209.
Given these seven opinions, no one can plausibly dispute that cottage site leasing must
take place, at least where conflicting applications have been submitted, at a public auction to
maintain fidelity with Article [X, Section 8. The 1990 Act, however,foreclosed the Land Board
and the IDL from conducting such auctions. The legislative proscription thereby removes the
ability of, and any incentive for, a potential applicant who is not an existing lessee to submit an
applicatIon.

In so doing, the Act ran directly counter to the explicit language of Article IX,

Section 8 and imposed on the Board a duty-i.e., to make "market rent" assessments-that the
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Constitution's drafters committed to public auction process in the first instance. Section 58310A is plainly unconstitutionaL See Wasden, 2010 Idaho No. 128 at 17 n.1O (Burdick, J.,
dissenting) ("[a]lthough not argued by any party here,

I.e.

§ 58-3 lOA is clearly unconstitutional

as-in eliminating the conflict auction procedure and instead requiring 'market

rent'~the

legislature encroached upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board").

II.

A Preliminary Injunction Will Prevent The Land Board And Defendant Bacon
From Entering Into Ten-Year Leases Without Compliance With Idaho Code §§ 58307 Through -310 And Simply Maintain The Status Quo During This Suit's
Pendency
The Attorney General seeks a very limited remedy in this motion: maintenance of the

status quo untiJ the validity of the statute governing issuance of new cottage site leases is
resolved by preventing the Defendants from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases. The
declaratory relief requested as to the first claim for relief is limited similarly to a determination
of Idaho Code § 58-310A's constitutionality, with a permanent injunction that probibits the Land
Board and lDL from implementing the statute. The Attorney General, in sum, does not pursue

any remedy that will affect the 2001·2010 leases acquired under a then-unchallenged statute.
See State v. Village oj Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 526, 265 P.2d 328, 335 (1953) ("ra]n
unconstitutional law should not be applied to work a hardship or impose a liability on one who
has acted in good faith and relied on the validity of a statute before the courts have declared it
invalid").
The quite narrow remedial scope of the relief sought in the first claim can be preserved,
moreover, by the pendente lite relief presently sought. Should the Land Board and JDL enter
into the new leases, the clock effectively would have to be unwound by invalidating the leases
and beginning the application process afresh in accordance with Idaho Code §§ 58-307 through

-310. See Am. ind. Party in idaho. inc. v. Cenarussa, 92 Idaho 356, 359, 442 P.2d 766, 769
(1968) ("[ w}hen a statute by express language repeals a fonner statute and attempts to provide a
substitute therefor, which substitute is found to be unconstitutional, the repeal of the former
statute is of no effect, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the repeal to be
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effective even though the substitute statute were found invalid"); Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Hufj~
58 Idaho 587. 592, 76 P .2d 923, 925 (1938) ("the law is clear that an unconstitutional
amendment does not affect a previous statute, and the same remains undisturbed"). Relief at the

post-execution stage thus would likely require joinder of the parties to the new leases under
IRCP 19 and result in quite substantial, and unnecessary, procedural complexity that would
retard expeditious resolution of this case. See generally 7 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1613, at 200-03 (3d ed. 2001) (" [i]n cases seeking reformation,
cancellation, rescission, or otherwise challenging the vaJidity of a contract, aU parties 10 the
contract probably will have a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation and their joinder

wiH be required") (footnotes omitted). Preliminary injunctive relief is therefore particularly
appropriate here.
CONCLUSION
The motion for preliminary injunction should be granted.

DA TED this 2nd day of December 20 1O.
LA WRENCE A. WASDEN
ATTOR-\lEY GENERAL
STEVEN L OLSEN
Chief, Civil Litigation Division
Deputy Attorney General

BYti~&J
lay R. Smith
Deputy Attorney General
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and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:

HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY

LLP
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

DU.S,Mail

o Hand Delivery
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
o Overnight Mail

oo Facsimile:
(208) 746-0753
Email: mc1ark@.hawlej1roxell.com

CLA Y

R. SMITH
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Phillip S. Oberrccht
ISB # 1904, ~so@hallfarley.com

CoUeen D. Zahn
ISH #6208, cdz@ha!Jfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

TeJephone:
Facsimile:

(208) 395-8500
(208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ai\JD FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY
GLADYS

BACKBOCK,

as Trustee of the

BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BAReLA Y;

BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JA1v1ES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH,
as
trustee
of the
SANDRA
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MONTFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN 1. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMIL Y
] 988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOITE
KlNNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RlC.E-lARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: CONTRACT
CLAIMS

MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
ofthe ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMA.,."l\.l
DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the

DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH 1. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOW ARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAK-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ULA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRlCKSON,
as
Co-Trustccs
of
the
I-mNRIKSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HO~ and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN 1. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAl;'N KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the ESTATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CI~DY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON TRUST; DONNA MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
ALLEN
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JE~"-mE E. REITER; ROBERT D. and
KATY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DAVID
ROUSSEAU;
JOHN D.
RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMfLY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; O.
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNlfER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of 1he
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGORY and JULiE SURABIAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIl\ TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J'I
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER I
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co~ Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WlIITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JA YSON ARMSTRO~G, as Personal
Representative of the EST ATE OF KA."'mACE '
KEMP AR.\1STRONG, rcA. THY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co- Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE zrMMERMAN~ LINDA S. TURNER;
GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS~

I

and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as

j

Director of the ldaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, and pursuant to Idaho Rule

of Civil Procedure 56, and move this Court for its Order granting summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs on Counts I and II of their Amended Complaint on file in this matter.
This motion is supported by the Plaintiffs Mernorandtun in Support of Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims, the Affidavit of Colleen D. Zalm filed herewith, and
all pleadings and papers on file in this action.

Oral argument i~ested.
DATED this

0'fay of December, 20 I O.
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

By~~~~~~==~~______
Phillip S. bcrrecht - Of the Firm

Colleen . Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

[B U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby

HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701- J617
Fax No. 954-5210

o
o
o
o

Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail

TeJecopy
Electronic Transmission
mcJark@hawlcytroxell.com
jashbylal,hawleytroxeIl.com

COlleen~

•

P=
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
rSB #1904.l1so(ll),hallfarley.com

Colleen D. Zahn
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarJey.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

Telephone:
facsimile:

(208) 395-8500
(208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA IE OF IDAHO, eN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAlLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH,
as
trustee
of the SANDRA
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MONTFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOU; MARTIN L. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMILY
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFlX
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFlX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; L ¥NNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRUST; COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICl-IARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNEIT G. DAY and DO!:'!.'NA DA Y
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN
DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYK1'vfAN; WENDY
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAlN R. TARRANT and
JANET 1. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; ULA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KExr
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
of the
HENRICKSON,
as
Co-Trustees
HENRIKSEN FAMILY TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA illPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH 1. I
HON; RlCHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEI", as i
Trustee of the JENSEN F AMIL Y TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the EST ATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE ~1CK and JAN LARREA~
SHARON 1. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCK1NLEY; VIVIAN
MC~lGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMlLY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED 1.
FERGUSON
TRUST;
DONNA
MOORE;
WILLlAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCII; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA HI
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KlMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
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PARK. and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAK PISTEY
TRUST; JEAh1NE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KATY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PA..\fELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DAVID ROUSSEAU;
JOHN D.
RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; O.
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JA~ES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMITII, as Co-Trustees of the
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
scon THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURl"JER;
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; 1.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE.
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZJMMER, as Co· Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5,1998;
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN; LINDA S. TURNER;

I

I

GLORlA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAl\'O COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity liS
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton,
P,A., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, submit this memorandum in support of
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

For the reasons set forth herein, there are no

genuine issues of material fact, and Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their
contract claims, which are contained in Counts I and

n of their

Amended Complaint in this

matter.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant State Board of Land Commissioners (hereinafter "Land Board") entered into
lease agreements with the Plaintiffs for cottage sites at Payette Lake. The leases are co-signed
and administered by Defendant Idaho Department of Lands (hereinafter "Department of Lands").
The leases provide a right to renew, and Plaintiffs have exercised that right. 1bc Department of
Lands has rejected Plaintiffs' requests to renew their leases and instead informed Plaintiffs that it

will unilaterally impose new leases on Plaintiffs with new terms, including a new ren.tal rate
formula,
The law is clear that when the lease fails to specify a different rent for the renewal term,
the existing rent continues for the renewal term. Plaintiffs seek an Order directing the Land
Board and Department of Lands to renew the existing leases for the renewal period. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the fair market value of their
improvements constructed on the leasehold premises, as provided by the lease terms.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Land Board entered into leases \\oith each of the Plaintiffs, which concern parcels of
State Endowment Land near and around Payette Lake (hereinafter "the cottage site leases"). See

Affidavit of Bob Bramer ("Bramer A.ff "), , 2 and Exh. A. The Land Board drafted the lease
document, which is for a I O-year period beginning on January I, 2001 and ending on December
31, 2010. See Id. Each Plaintiff agreed to the lease tenus which are the same as those contained
in the lease attached as Exhibit "A" to the Bramer Affidavit. TIlls lawsuit concerns two lease
sections, which provide a right to renew the existing lease tenns. Lease section C.I.l gives
Plaintiffs the right to renew the existing lease:

C.

LEASE TERMIRENEWAL

1.1
Provided by Statute. The term of this lease shall be for no more than ten
(10) years pursuant to Idaho Code (I.C.) § 58-307(1)', and for the period of years
as set forth in the attached cover lease. Renewals of this lease may be granted by
the LESSOR as determined by the LESSOR at the LESSOR'S discretion pursuant
2
to I.e. § 58-3 lOA .
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs' right to renew is again addressed in lease section K.1.4.b, which
affirms the State will not unreasonably withhold approval of Plaintiffs' applications to renew:
1.4.h. I.:pOD Non-Renewal By Lessor. Should LESSEE appJy to renew this
lease in the manner provided by law and such application be denied, then
LESSOR shall purchase the approved improvemt::nts placed or caused to be
placed on the leased premises by LESSEE, at the fair market value of such
improvements as of the effective date of the expiration. Fair market value of
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal
by the LESSEE shall not be unreasonably withheld.
(Emphasis added.) This section also provides that if the Land Board denies renewal applications,
the Land Board will compensate Plaintiffs for the fair market value of their improvements.

At the time the leases were executed, Idaho Code Section 58-307 provided for a maximum 10- year lease tenn.
Idaho Code Section § 58-310A provides cottage site leases are not subject to the conflict auction procedure
applicable to other categories of State endowment lands, and that in the absence of conflict auctions the Land Board
is to enSure there are stable leases ir: place that generate market rent.
I

2
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The current lease does not specify a rental rate to be charged during the renewal term that
is any different than the lease's rental rate formula during the original lease period. Section

D. 1.1, provides the rent formula to be used:
1.1

Rental Rate. Rent shall be two and one half (2.5%) of current fee simple
value of the leased premises, as determined by valuation administered by
the LESSOR or by valuatiDn as determined by the assessor. The value of
the leased premises shall be determined as though the leased premises is
vacant and unimproved, subject to any outstanding rights and reservations
of record, and without any deduction or credit for LESSEE-owned site
improvements. This rental rate was adopted and approved by the Idaho
State Board of Land Commissioners on December 14, 1998.

On March 16, 2010, the Land Board voted to increase the rent formula for new leases
beginning January I, 2011, from 2.5% of the appraised value to 4% of a ten-year average of the
appraised value. See Bramer Aff., Exh. C, pp. 36-37. The increase from 2.5% to 4% will be

phased in over a 5-ycar period. See Jd.
Plaintiffs timely applied to renew their existing cottage site leases in a writing sent to the
Department of Lands tithing the statutory time period, thereby salisfying the legal requirements
to renew their leases. See Affidavit afColleen D. Zahn ("Zahn Aff"), ~ 2 and Exh. A. In doing

so, Plaintiffs expressly reserved their right to renew on the same terms as set forth ln the existing
lease. See ld In a letter dated March 3], 2010, the Department of Lands refused to recognize
Plaintiffs' renewal notices, and stated that Plaintiffs were required to fill out a renewal
application created by the Department of Lands, which is not a requirement imposed by statute
or the lease. See Bramer Ajf, Exh. D. The Department also stated that renewal would only be
available on the terms offered by the Land Board in their entirely new lease. See [d.
The March 3 1 letter included what the Department caned a "template" lease. See Id The
template was watennarked with the word "Template" across the front of each page, did not
provide any identifying infonnation specific to particular lessees, and did not contain a signature
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bJock. See Id. The Department stated it would contact the lessees should any action be taken by
the Land Board that would change the lease template, thus indicating the template was simply a
draft and potentially subject to further revision. See [d. The Department also indicated that in
early fall it would send out lease documents for the new leases to those lessees that returned the
Department of Lands' form. See Id
Out of an abundance of caution and not wanting to give the Department of Lands a
reason to argue Plaintiffs failed to timely apply for renewal, Plaintiffs retumed the Department of
Lands' renewal fonn, reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them by
the Department of Lands. See Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn. J The current
lease tenn is set to expire in less than a month, yet as of the date of this motion Plaintiffs have
not received new leases. However, based on the statements contained in the Department of
Lands' March 31 letter and the actions of the Land Board on March 16, Plaintiffs believe the
new leases will contain new terms, including the increased rent formula approved by the Land
Board on March 16.
In order to protect their lease rights, Plaintiffs filed Ibis lawsuit on October 22,2010. The
suit alleges two claims for breach of contract--one seeking to compel specific perfonnance of
the renewal term, including continuation of the 2.5% rent formuJa, and the other an alternative
claim, seeking compensation for site improvements due to the Land Board's refusal to renew the
current leases. See Amended Complaint,

,.~

28-41. These are the two claims at issue in this

partial summary judgment motion.

This assertion is made on infmmation and belief, and could be confmned if the Defendants had timely responded
to discovery requests the Plaintiffs served on them on October 22, 2010. See Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn, 1 3.
Defendants' responses to the discovery requests were due November 22, but Defendants have refused to provide
responses.
J
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For the reasons set forth below, the Land Board's attempt to unilaterally impose a new
lease with a new rent fonnula on existing lessees constitutes a breach of the lease's renewal
provisions. There are no genuine issues of material fact at issuc, and Plaintiffs are entitled to
judgment as a matler of law, granting them specific performance of the existing lease terms
during the renewal period, including continuation of the 2.5% rent formula. In the alternative, if
the Court refuses to require the Land Board to approve Plaintiffs' applications to renew the
existing leases, Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance, in the form of compensation from
the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands, for the market value of their respective
improvements .

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are to be liberally construed in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole

Fence Co., Inc, 134 Idaho 626, 628, 7 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2000). If, however, the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matler of law, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Selkirk Seed Co. v. State

Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 436-37, 18 PJd 956, 958-59 (2000).
I11I
11//

/111
1I1I
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ARGUMENT
1.

The EXisting Rent Formula Is Applkablc DUTing the Renewal Period.
A.

The leases unambiguously provide Plaintiffs a right t() renew tbe
existing leases.

A lease is a contract, and therefore what controls when interpreting a lease is the parties'
intent and the plain meaning of the contract language. See JR. Simp!of Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138
Idaho 557, 564, 67 P.3d 36, 43 (2003).

The intent of the parties should, if possible, be

ascertained from the language of the documents. See Twin Lakes Village Property Assoc., Inc. v.

Twin Lakes Investment, 124 lelaho 132, 135,857 P.2d 611, 614 (1993). In construing a written
instrument, the court must consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the
writing to the extent possible. See Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437, 18

PJd 956, 959 (2001).
The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect is a question of law when the
contract is clear and unambiguous. See lei.

In deciding whether a document is ambiguous, a

court must detennine whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." See Chavez
V.

Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 2]9, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008). In the absence of ambiguity, the

document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning
derived from the plain wording of the instrument.

See /d.

In other words, unambiguous

contracts must be interpreted as written. Culp v. Tri-Counly Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 899,
736 P.2d 1348, 1353 (Ct. App. 1987).
The cottage site leases at issue in this matter unambiguously provide Plaintiffs with a
right to renew the leases. Section C.l.1 provides for renewals of this lease. Neither Section
C.t.l, nOT any other section of the lease imposes any different terms upon renewal.

While

Section c.1.1 does provide renewals may be granted at the Lessor's discretion, Section K.1.4.b
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provides that approval of a request for renewal shall not be unreasonably withheJd. Plaintiffs
have complied with all statutory and contractual requirements to renew their leases.

Affidavit of Colleen D. Zahn,

Til 2-3

See

and Exh. A. There is no reason to believe that any of the

Plaintiff lessees have defaulted under, or otherwise failed to comply in good faith with the terms
of the leases. The Department of Lands, however, has rejected the Plaintiffs' notices of renewal

without explanation for its refusal to renew the existing leases.

Defendants, therefore, have

breached the leases by refusing, without reasonable cause, to renew the leases.
In the event the Land Board chooses not to grant a request to renew, the lease is likewise

unambiguous in requiring the Land Board andlor Department of Lands to compensate Plaintiffs
for the fair market value of their improvements:

1.4.b. Upon Non-Renewal By Lessor. Should LESSEE apply to renew this
lease in the manner provided by law and such application be denied, then
LESSOR shall purchase the approved improvements placed or caused to be
placed on the leased premises by LESSEE. at the fair market value of such
improvements as of the effective date ofthe expiration. Fair market value of
LESSEE improvements shall be established by appraisal. A request for renewal
by the LESSEE shall not be unreasonably withheld.

(Emphasis added.) See Id. at § K.1.4.b,
B.

The failure to specify a rent formula for tbe renewal period means the
existing rent formula applies during the renewal period.

Al1hough Idaho's appellate courts do not appear to have addressed the rent term to be
applied during a renewal period when a lease fails to specifY such a rental rote, multiple other
appellate courts have done so. As is intuitively obvious, where a lease covenant for renewal is
general and does not state the terms of the renewal lease, the new lease is to be upon the same
general terms and conditions as the old lease, including that of rent.

Enterprises, Inc.

11.

See Little Caesar

Bell Canyon Shopping Center, I.C., 13 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

(quoting Cummings v. Rytting, 207 P.2d 804, 805 (Utah 1949) ("It has long been settled in Utah
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that '[w]herc the covenant for renewal is general and does not state the terms of the renewal
lease, the new lease is to be upon the same general tenns and conditions as the old lease. '''); See

also Bishop Cafeteria Co. afOmaha v. Ford, 129 N.W.2d 581,587-88 (Neb. 1964) (<<Wnere the
covenant for renewal is general and docs not state the terms of the renewal lease, the new lease is
to be upon the same general terms and conditions as the old lease, which are applicable to the
renewal period."); Yamin v. Levine, 206 P.2d 596, 597 (Colo.1949) ("A general covenant to
extend or renew implies an additional term equal to the first, and upon the same terms, induding
that of rent."); Idol v. Little, 396 S.E.2d 632, 633-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) ("Accordingly,
consistent with lv/cAdoo and Young, an optional renewal provision in a lease which is silent on
the amount of rent due upon renewal of the lease and which does not provide that the renewal
rent will be set by the parties' future agreement is valid and enforceable, and the amount of rent
due upon renewal is impliedly the amount of rent due under the original lease."); Aldridge v.

Young, 689 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ("It is an established rule that a general
covenant to renew or extend a lease which is siLent as to the terms of the renewal or extension
implies a renewal or extension upon the same 1erms and conditions as provided in the original
lease .. .it is implied that the rent is the same as that provjded in the original lease. "); Penilla v.

Gerstenkorn, 261 P. 488, 489 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1927) ("A general covenant to extend or
renew implied an additional term equal to the first, and upon the same terms, including that of
rent, except the covenant to renew; to include which would make the lease perpetua1."). Legal
treatises are in accord. See 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 101, 102 (2010); 49 Am. Jur. 2d

Landlord and Tenant § 134 (2010); Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leases, § 14:1 at *14-8.
(2010).

The inc1usion of a general renewal clause, however, only entitles the Jessee to one

additional term of renewal and does not incorporate another renewal term unless a new
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agreement is executed that provides otherwise. See Bishop, 129 J\'.W.2d at 587; PenilJa, 261 P.

at 670; See also Friedman on Leases, § 14: 1 at 14-11.
Of partlcular significance in this case is an Arizona decision holding that a clause
granting the lessee an option to renew "this lease," incorporated by reference all tenns of the
existing lease:
The contested language provides the lessee with an option to "extend this lease,"
which is a general covenant to renew devoid of any explicit recitation of the
amount of rent to be paid during the extended torm. However, by referring to
"this" lease, the option provision incorporates by reterence all the rest of the lease
agreement, including the provision specifying a rental rate of $1400 per month.
Thus the option provision imports a new lease on the same terms and conditions.

See McCutchin v. SC'A Services of Arizona, Inc., 709 P.2d 591, 592-93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
The same "this lease" language is used in the renewal provision contained in section C.l.l of the
cottage site leases. The Land Board drafted the lease and therefore could have provided the rent

to be charged for the renewal term. Instead of doing so, however, it chose to remain silent,
thereby indicating its intent to continue under the same rent formula for the renewal tenn. The
lease terms provide for the adjustment of rent based on the appraised value of the properties,
thereby ensuring the leases generate market rent during the lease tenn.
The Land Board detennined the terms of the existing leases, and decided to grant a
general r1ght of renewal. The lessees agreed to the lease terms. The Land Board cannot now
ignore the lease tenns that it drafted, and attempt to unilaterally discard various provisions of the
leases it created.

The Court may not impose a term on the pa."ties' contract that was not

otherwise agreed to by the parties. See Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielsen, 136 Jdalto
814, 823.41 P.3d 242, 251 (2001); See also Medical Svc 's Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge No. 310

Benev. And Prot. Order of Elks, ] 26ldalto 90, 95, 878 P.2d 789, 794 (et. App. 1994). The Land

Board's attempt to force new Lease terms on the renewing Plaintiffs constitutes a breach of the
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existing lease's renewal provisions, and will prevent Plaintiffs from enjoying the benefits of their
lease contracts, violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every
contract. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count I of their Amended
Complaint.

2.

Plaintiffs Are Entitled tv Specific Performance of tbe Lease Terms.

Plaintiffs have prayed for specific performance on Count J of their Complaint, seeking an
Order enjoining the Land Board from changing the terms in the leases. Specific performance is
an extraordinary remedy developed by courts of equity to provide relief when the legal remedies
are inadequate. Garner v Barlschi, 139 Idaho 430, 435, 80 P.3d ] 03], ] 036 (2003); See also

Karterman v. Jameson, 132 Idaho 910,914,980 P.2d 574,578 (Ct. App. 1999). It is generally
presumed that a contract for the sale or lease of 1and does not enjoy an adequate remedy at law

and is entitled to specific performance. See Karlerman, 132 Idaho at 913, 980 P.2d at 577. In
this instance, Plaintiffs' lease rights are unique property rights. There is no adequate remedy at
law if they are deprived of their right to continued possession under the existing lease terms,
including the current rent formula. Plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the renewal

clause, including incorporation of the existing rent formula.
3.

In tbe Alternative, Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Receive Compensation

For Their Improvements.
Count II of the Amended Complaint pleads an alternate claim seeking specific
performance of the lease term providing Plaintiffs compensation for their improvements. In the
event the Court refuses to grant Plaintiffs' request to reneW on the same lease terms, the lease
unambiguously requires the Land Board and/or Department of Lands to compensate Plaintiffs for
the fair market value of their improvements. See Bramer AjJ., Exh. A, § K.] A.b.
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Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe they have two alternate remedies, and the law grants
Plaintiffs the right to elect which remedy they choose. Ejection of remedies is the right of a
party in an action to choose one of two or more co-existing remedial rights, where such rights
arise out of the same facts; but the term is generally limited to a choice by a party between
inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to or the
repudiation of the other.

Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97 Idaho SOl, 505, 547 P.2d 546, 550

(J 976) (abrogated by statute on other grounds). One of the elements which is a prerequisite to

application of the doctrine is that the remedies available be inconsistent. Id. That is certainly
present in this case. The lease terms do not permit Plaintiffs to both remain in possession under
the existing rent fonnula, and receive compensation for their improvements. Both remedies are
based on the same fact-the Land Board's breach of the lease's renewal term. Plaintiffs have
established a right to elect their remedy, and the Court's Order granting summary judgment
should accordingly include language reflecting Plaintiffs have the right to this election.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to a partial summaI)' judgment,
holding that Defendants have breached the renewal term of Plaintiffs' cottage site leases.
Plaintiffs are also entitled to partial summary judgment aJlo,ving them to elect their remedy in
this matter, either: (1) granting them specific performance to continue in possession of the lease

premises during the renewal period under the existing lease terms, including the rental rate
formula; or (2) allowing them to surrender possession of the leased premises and directing

Defendants to pay them compensation for the fair market value of their improvements.
//1/

111/
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.~day of December, 201 D.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thIs

r

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

BY:~~~~~~~-C~~§L___
Phillip S. 0 rrecht - Of the Firm
Colleen D. ~ahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the fonowing:

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HA \llLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA VlLEY, LLP

877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Fax No. 954-5210

~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

o
o
o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Transmission
mc1ark@hawleytroxell.com

jashby(al.hawleytroxelL.com
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904. pso@hallfarley.com

Colleen D. Zahn
ISB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

HALL. FARLEY. OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W \4\4-0&2. JIPI.2ADINGSIMSJ--IIFOB--Aff Zahn.doc

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC1AL DISTRlCT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRGST; LAURA L. BARCLA y~
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAlLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH,
as trustee of the
SANDRA
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MOl\TFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE FAMIL Y
1988 TRUST; CHRlSTINE M. CAR.'1EFIX
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELLIBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER~ LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRGST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RlCHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BE~ETI G. DAY and DON'NA DAY
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JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
.\{ARJORlE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAP!'vfAN
DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DfXIE DYK.1VfAN; WENDY
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; M1CHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL~
RONALD and STACY 1. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK.; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRICKSON,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
HENRIKSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKIvfAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; M1CHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMILY TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DA \\IN J. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUK KAY; KARIN KJNG, as
personal representative for the ESTA TE Of
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY F AMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN I
.\IfCKl';1GHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. & .
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON
TRUST;
DONNA
MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHa,
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'~EIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY. as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANNE E. REITER; ROBERT D. and
KATY 1. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DAVID ROUSSEAU;
JOHN D. RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMJTH, as Co-Trustees of the I
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as I
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN

TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN;
CATHY

PETERSON,

as

Trustee

of

THE

MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRlSTOPHER C.
TIIOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN 1. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J.
LA..\40NTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the

WALKER MARlTAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTROl\G, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATIIY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP

I

DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN~ LINDA S. TURNER;

GLORIA B. SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COfvfMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
S8.

County of Ada

)

COLLEEN D. ZAHN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiffs in this marter, and as such I

have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a "Notice of Election

Exercising Option to Renew Residential Site Lease." which was signed by the trustee of Plaintiff
The Babcock Trust, and mailed to Defendants Idaho Board of Land Commissioners ("Land
Board") and Idaho Department of Lands ("Department of Lands") in March 2010.

The

document provided Defendants notice of the Trust's exercise of its right to renew its cottage site
lease under the existing lease terms, including the rental rate term. A review of documents
received from Defendant Department of Lands pursuant to a public records request, reveals the

majority. jf not all the P1aintiffs, mailed Notices with substantially similar language to the
Department of Lands, providing notice of their intent 10 exercise their rights to renew their

cottage site leases.
3.

In March 2010, the Department of Lands mailed aU Plaintiffs a letter, rejecting

the Notices referred to in paragraph 2 of this Affidavit, and indicating that if Plaintiffs wished to
renew their leases, they would need to ftll out a Department of Lands form. An exa.'nple of this
letter is attached as Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Bob Bramer on file in this matter. Based on
infonnation and belief, all Plaintiffs timely returned the Department of Lands form, giving notice
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that they intended to exercise their contractual right to renew their respective cottage site leases,
but reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them. See Exhibit "B"
attached hereto as a true and correct example of one of those forms returned by the Plaintiffs to

the Department of Lands. Plaintiffs have propounded discovery requests to Defendants, seeking
documents that would substantiate this assertion, but Defendants have thus far refused to provide
responses to the discovery requests until a decision is issued on Defendants' pending motion to
dismiss. Plaintiffs shall file a motion to compel these discovery responses.

When Plaintiffs

receive Defendants' discovery responses, they should be able to provide the Court with evidence

that Plaintiffs did return the Department of Lands fonn.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.

Colleen

~~ .1,L

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day ofDeccmber, 2010.

~dr~

My Commission EXPires:~jy;y-,3j=-'::,1.?4,i,-'I_.:L
__

AFFIDA VIT OF COLLEEN D. ZAHN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

106

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--f-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby

lE

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
Overnight Mail
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
D Telecopy
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Electronic Transmission
Fax No. 954-5210
mclark@bawleytroxell.com
jashby@,hawleytroxeU.com

o
o

o

COIl~·!t~
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EXHIBIT "A"
108

r

NOTICE OF ELECTION EXERCISING OPTION TO RENEW RESIllENTIAL
SITEy;ASE

The undersigned Jessee herebYllCrves notice to the Stato of Idaho. Ide.bo
Department of Lands, and it., &ard of Lund Commissioners, of the undcnigncd lessee's
exerei.se of its option 10 renew the lease sC.llted below for an additional term of ten (l0)
years, effective January [. 2011 or \lpon tho expiration of the undersigned leasc. it is
furdl(:r understood that Iossec's option will he exercised on the same terms as set forth in
the current ICllse. but with the rental rate theret'oce at a reasonable andlor market rent, not
exceeding the annual rate of 2.5% of the leased propcny's appra1sed or assessed value,
whichever is leas.

Lease Property:

The Babcock Trust

Lease Number:

R5082

Lessee (slgnature):

Name (print):

The Babcock Trust by Gladys Babcock as Trustee

Date:

March 11, 2010

Current Address:

c/o Diane Babcock, 2100 Habersham Marina Road
#301A, Cumming, GA

Telephone:

404-915-4909

E-lJUIiJ ;

d babco~hotlllail.com(

30041

plttotten@gtotts.com

~
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EXHIBIT "8"
110

REsgVATION OF RIGHIS

Idaho Department of Lands

300 North 61h Street, Suite 103

P.O. Ball 83720
Boise. ldaho 83720-0050
Re:

Reservation ofRigbts Re: Cottage Site Lease

To Idaho Department of Lands:

Enclosed is the elC:ecutcd Application for Use of State Lands which the State of Idaho has
demlUlded that we execute if we want to preserve our rights in our leased property as doscribed

below.
We previously exercised our right to renew OUf existing Cottage Site Lease ("Lease")
pursuant to the terms of that Lease. Our effort to renew :n accordance with the terms of our
existing arrangement has been rejected by the State of Idaho and instead we are being compelled
to sign the Application for Use in order to protect our substantia1 mvestment in our leased
property. Accordingly, we reserve all of our rights under our ex.isting Lease as well lIS our right
to renew that Lease.

By lhe execution oftbe Application for Use at your insistence, we are not waiving any of
our substantial rights that we currently have and are doing so solely in order to protect our
investment in our property.

Leased Property: ')...4s8 fANIV~"'41rY ~,' /\fc;.~,

'D f!'J'1ii'

It.-A-__
-- ;:i> S?-.
Lease NO.: _ _ _

.,.....--.4,.....j..-----------

Lessee (S ignalurc
Name (Print)::l!:1'fJ1!:.::.TiLt.J.''J"I/~~...J,i:!C!1(,d,;.a::!~~:..t-.:::..!~~~~~~

Date: -.:1JI-!..I..;;..r..:..!t:-o_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-_~

Bl.u4.wtJO/j Av'~.) !JolU.s ~t HY/-of:;:il':l..
Telephone:(j10 l{7f' -e~-$::''''CurrcJ1tAddress: '("L{

E-Mail:

AtY~·.5A-t-~@II~.NG.r-
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APPLICATION FOR USE OF
STATE LANDS
No,.: AI! IIPPlJctJrion left .,. tJD/HflfundBbs.. /noOm/Jlflte app/IcatlOflS wJlf b9 f'Bjttct8d lind f8tlJmed to spp/fcant.
- APplicANT DATA: All documBnIB must conla/n rhe fuIJ flllflai nams of the Bpplic8nt or the blJ$lrtsss 9ntlly name on rile with
t
fJla Idaho S~at.tl)' 0 , Stat.. CBffIti.iCSIff of Good SffJf1di'n{J mIJSI be provided for all bus1n9ss fN'Ilioos. If a dd1t~onaI eppItcans
chfICk Me

and add AftaChmBnt B.

Business Entity Name:

IndiYldu •• Nllme:
SaI!:zman
Last
Mgl1ln
Flrwt
Middle J
DBA:

Bualness Registration No.

Address of Record (for AU. t:OtTe$pondenca)
84 BeRewood A'Ie

Street:

Contact tnformldlon
Business:

COntact Nllme:

PO Bo~:
Dobbs Ferry
City:
NY
Stete:
10522
Zip +4:

Cont.ct Name:

Country:

Contact Name:

Attention:

Cefl
CodWPl'IDnel:
Contact Name:

Fax:
Home:

"!"1M

Title:
Email Addres_(ts):

DESCRIBE PROPOSED USE (check htn ~"d BttadJ IIdtJltkmlll pages If ntHlded):

Residential - Cottage
PROVIDE LEGAL DESCRIPTloN(S) ON ATTACHMENT A
( hereby certify that I am the applicant or authorized representative of th8 applicant and that the informstlon
r::ontalned in this appllcatlo/1 Is true and COfTeCl to the besl of my knowledge end further acknOwledge that
falsification of any Information contained herein, or provided herewJth, wDi be graun
for rejection of the

application.
Date

~ -;vi)

')-IJI O

Business Name (If applicable)

Stille of

t-.NU.J -:cJlg,

TIlle (if applicable)

)

~
JJss.
COl.1I11y orc..t..a.&0\9.).

~I

~

.. ... /\ _ •

10

I~I.}

s: .L _

J

r'\.-(~~
c..-t...ri\{1{\-0

On this ~'I day o f .
, in the year 2Ol.-. personally appeared
known Or id9nti/ied to me to be the
~ name is subscribed to the within Instrument, and acknowledged 10 me thal
he/shallhey executed tile sarna.

Pbr

~,

NOI.",e,blo

My Commission Expires:

Current

Im.trument No.B5052

New In&tnlment No. R5000s2

f'._~~i"iti Bf!ni!ieQ)jf!!

{).It:.. &I~I

cloIu

l!sa ~!ltl&iiCQ!la9§ ~. ;'(lB :L~. rut
Ro,. ~T;'G
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~

Current Instrument No.

PaecrlpUon

!Wn

BmI

IEIRD.

lIN

03E

04

.

~.-

/'IrnIIfIIIIl-"'''
«.11_ _•
.,.alllfl;
(fo""~

LoU

- .. _--- ......
,

,
If

.kI!mIY.

Ill!:
.ElmIO.

V.lay

NS

~

----- ---

-
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Attachment B - Multiple Applicants

"

business tIIlIfity, informstlon reqUfrfJd for stl bW/nflSS principals.

Current Instrument No. R5052
FIrst
c.Y...,nHAMIddle
1..
DBA:
Addren 01 Record (for ALL corre_portdenott}
Street:
POBox:

~c(U~~IW",

City:
Stllte:
ZIp .....:
Country:
Attention:
Title:

t>DSes.

.

New Instrument No R500052

....

Indlvldual Name: '~'" 0". 1..1lM~J)) ~
Last
4. .....
-,

Business Entity Name:

Buslne.s Reglltratlca ND.
Com.et Information
Business:
Contact Name:

~~~:<

Fu::
Contact Nllme;

H~
l If) <""').?" ? '3 ') ~

Home:
Contact Name;
Cell AIWII CadWPhonel:
Contact Nama:
Email Addr"s(CI8};

Individual Name:

Bu.tn_ Entity "" __ :

~t

First
Middle
DBA:
Address of Record (lor ALL corresportdence)

Bu..... Registration No.

Contact Information
BUIlIn_:

Street:
PO Box:

--

Contact Name:

Fax:

City:
State:

Contact NM1e:

Zip +4:
Country:
Attention:

Contact NanM:

TIDe:

Home:
Ceil AI'INI Coda'Phonel:
Contact NIIIYI.:

email Addreq(e$):

APPUCATJOH· Page 3 of 3
ATTACHMENT 8 - Spouse or Trustees for a Family Trust
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Phillip S. Oberrecht

Vi: C 1 ~ lOin

ISS #1904, pso@hallfarley.com

Colleen D. Zahn
ISS #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

J. DAVID NAV.4F1liO,

CIQ,I.,

Sy I!. NOIJ.U;g
O:::;"vr",

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box J271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\ol\4-682.1IWasden v ILS-State CourtIIntervene-Mtn.doc

Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE O. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex ref. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,

Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751

o

:::0

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO INTERVENE

-

G)

-

vs.

Z

STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,

)::>

r-

Defendants.

COME NOW, the Proposed Defendants in Intervention, Babcock, et al., the holders of
Payette Lake Cottage Site Lessees identified in the [Proposed] Answer and Notice of
Intervention, by and through their undersigned attorneys, and hereby move this Court, pursuant
to Rule 24 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to intervene in this case as additional
party defendants.
Accompanying this motion, and attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is the (Proposed] Answer
and Notice ofIntervention, submitted herewith pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil P:-ocedure 24( c).
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The Motion to Intervene is supported by the accompanying Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Intervene, Affidavit of W. Anthony Park in Support of Motion to Intervene, and all
other pleadings and documents on file in this matter.
DATED this

It'~ of December, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

By:-+~.JlL~~~:::::::~~~ _ __

Phillip S. berrecht - Of the Firm
Colleen . Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICAT

F SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ ay of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
CJay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2 nd Floor
POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720

D fif.s.

Mail, Postage Prepaid
~ Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
D Telecopy 854-8073
D Email

D

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA WLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-161 7
.com
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EXHIBIT A
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904, pso@hallfarley.com

Colleen D. Zahn
ISS #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:14\4-682.1\Wasden

\I

ILB·Slale Courtllntervene Answer<doc

Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751

(PROPOSEDJ ANSWER AND
NOTICE IN INTERVENTION

vs.
STA TE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,

Defendants, and
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vs.
GLADYS BABCOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH,
as
trustee
of the
SANDRA
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MONTFORD
M.
BROOKS; GREGG BURINGTON and H.
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN L. and JANIS G.
BURKE, as Co-Trustees for the BURKE F AMIL Y
1988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELL/BARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE
KINNEY
TRUST;
COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RICHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA L.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON and
MARTIN 1. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY
JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORIE DAY TRUST; DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and
TERESA
CHAPMAN
DUCHARME,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
HARPER;
MICHAEL HENRIKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRIKSEN,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
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HENRIKSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DA \VN 1. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KA.UFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the EST ATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMIL Y LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEEANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMIL Y TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON TRUST;
DONNA MOORE;
WILLlAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. O'GARA III
FAMILY TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KA TY L. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DAVID ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMIL Y TRUST; DEBORAH 1. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CYNOY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRlC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARBARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the
SMITH FAMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK. as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
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TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABIAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABfN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LfNDA S. TURNER;
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE!
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRE1'<'N; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER I
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998; ,
SUZANNE
ZIMMERMAN;
GLORIA
B.
SALLADA Y;
GREGG
and
SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
[Proposed] Defendants in
Intervention.

COME NOW Defendants in Intervention ("Defendants"), Gladys BABCOCK et at.
("BABCOCK et at. "), who are lessees of cottage site leases with the State Board of Land
Commissioners ("Land Board") and the Idaho Department of Lands ("IDL"), by and through
their counsel of record, HaJJ, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and for their Answer to
Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint") admit, deny, and
allege as follows:
By pleading certain defenses as "affirmative defenses." Defendants do not imply that
they have the burden of proof for any such defense. In addition, in asserting any of the following
defenses, Defendants do not admit any fault, responsibility, liability or damage but, to the
contrary, expressly deny the same. Furthermore, as the Defendants have not had an opportunity
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to conduct discovery in this case, the Defendants, by failing to raise an affirmative defense, do
not waive any such defense and specifically reserve the right to amend their answer to include
additional affirmative defenses.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Defendants deny each and every allegation contained in the Complaint except as
specifically admitted herein.
1.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs A.2, A.4, and A.5 of the

Complaint.
2.

Defendants admit that Plaintiff is the Attorney General of the State of Idaho, that

he is an officer established by the Constitution of the State of Idaho and that Idaho statutes
govern his responsibilities as such.

Those constitutional and statutory provisions speak for

themselves.
3.

The constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law quoted and referred to by

Plaintiff throughout his Complaint speak for themselves, must be read in their entirety, and do
not require admission or denial.
4.

Defendants have insufficient information upon which to base a belief as to the

allegations in paragraphs l.(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), C.9, C.1O, C.ll, C.12, 0.13, 0.14, D.]5, E.16,
E.17, E.18, E.19, F.20(a),(b),(c), 0.21 (a),(b), 0.22, H.23, H.24, and 1.25, and for lack of
information deny the same.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs references to dicta from the Supreme Court of Idaho's recent decision holding
that Plaintiff was not entitled to a VvTit of prohibition because he had an adequate remedy at law
are irrelevant.
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff cannot comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 65 and therefore is not entitled
to a permanent injunction.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has set forth in his Complaint many factual statements as if they were official
findings of fact when they are nothing more than opinions, inferences, conclusions and
inadmissible statements which have not been subjected to the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint consists of many legal conclusions that are vigorously contested.

SIXTH AFFIR.\1ATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his Complaint.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, waiver and laches.

NOTICE

1.

Defendants have filed suit in this Judicial District in Valley County against the

State Board of Land commissioners and the Department of Lands asserting claims for breach of
lease and the unconstitutional application of Idaho Code, Section 58-31OA.

That action is

pending before Judge Michael McLaughlin. An accurate copy of the Complaint in that case is
attached hereto and marked Exhibit A for the Court's information.
2.

The Defendants have filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their breach

of lease claims in Valley County and the Board of Land Commissioners and the Department of
Lands have filed a motion to dismiss in that case.
WHEREFORE, Defendants having fully answered the Complaint, pray for judgment in
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their favor and against Plaintiff dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and with costs to the
Defendants.

DATED this

day of December, 20 to.

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

8y: _____________________________
Phillip S. Oberrecht - Of the Firm
Colleen D. Zahn - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants in Intervention
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

o
o
o
o
o

LA WRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
nd
954 W. JetTerson. 2 Floor
POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HA WLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Fax No. 954-5210

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (208) 854-8073
EmaiJ

o
o
o
o

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Transmission
mclarkfalhawleytroxell.com
jashby@hawleytroxell.com

o

Phillip S. Oberrecht
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EXHIBIT A
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
ISB #1904, pso@hallfiU:1ey.cQm

Colleen D. Zahn
[SB #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 127]
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395~8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585
W:\4\4-682.IIPLEADINOS\Complllint - Amended.doc

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
GLADYS BACKBOCK, as Trustee of the
BABCOCK TRUST; LAURA L. BARCLAY;
BARBARA J. BARSNESS; THOMAS W.
BARTON; JAMES D. and SHANON N. BIVENS;
FRANK R. and ANGELES M. BORK; JAMES
and JEANNENE BOYD; NANCY BOYD; MAJLE TATE and HAROLD A. BRIDGES; JEFFREY
RUMPH, as trustee of the SANDRA
M.
BROMAGEN
TRUST;
MONTFORD
BROOKS; GREGG BURlNGTON and H.
ANTONIOLI; MARTIN 1. and JANlS G.
BURKE, as Co~Trustees for the BURKE FAMIL Y
J988 TRUST; CHRISTINE M. CARNEFIX
THOMAS,
as
Trustee
of
the
WENDELUBARBARA CARNEFIX TRUST;
JONATHAN P. CARTER; STEPHEN and TAMI
CASPER; LYNNE KINNEY, as Trustee for the
CHARLOTTE KINNEY TRUST; COLIN
GARDNER, as Trustee of the COLIN GARDNER
IV LIVING TRUST; RlCHARD E. and JOYCE
COOKE; RICHARD COPSEY; SERENA 1.
CROWLEY; CYNTHIA 1. ANDERSON and
MARTIN J. SALTZMAN; D. STANTON DALY;
FRANCINE DINGEL, as personal representative
of the ESTATE OF ALLYN DINGEL; JAMES D.
DOBBS; BENNETT G. DAY and DONNA DAY

AMENDED COMPLAINT - I

Case No. CV 2010-436C
AMENDED COMPLAINT

127

JACOBS, as Co-Trustees of the DONALD &
MARJORIE DA Y TRUST~ DAVID THATCHER
DUCHARME
and TERESA
CHAPMAN
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
DUCHARME,
DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY
and
BARBARA
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GERMAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER; JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN·ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
MICHAEL HENRICKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRICKSON,
as
Co-Trustees
of the
HENRIKSEN FAMlLY TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAN C. HILLIARD; WILLIAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN;
DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the ESTATE OF
CHARLES R. KING. JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAN LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON~ LEE S. and LEEANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKlNLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON
TRUST; DONNA MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA.
as Trustee of the EDWARD F. orGARA III
FAMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERL Y A. OSTROM; W. ANTHONY

AMENDED COMPLAINT - 2
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PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KA THY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as CoTrustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANNE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KATY L. REYNOLDS;
MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DA VID
ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CYNDY SALLADAY; CHARLES
and JANNIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARABARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the
SMITH FAMILY TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK, as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGORY and JULIE SURABlAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JULIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JOHN L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; 1.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the
WALKER MARITAL TRUST; MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WRENN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, KATHY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KAY KEMP
DILLON; EDWARD E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
F AMIL Y TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1998;
SUZANNE ZIMMERMAN; LINDA S. TURNER;
GLORIA S, SALLADAY; GREGG and SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AMENDED COMPLAINT· 3
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IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS;
and GEORGE BACON. in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.

COME NOW the above-named plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Hall,
Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton. P.A., and for good cause against the above-named defendants,
complain and allege as follows:

I.
PARTIES
I.

Plaintiffs are lessees of certain parcels of real property located in Valley County,

Idaho near Payette Lake. Defendant, Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"),
as lessor, leased to Plaintiffs said parcels in exchange for payment of annual rent to the Land
Board and promises made to the Land Board. The leases give Plaintiffs certain rights and
remedies with respect to the parcels of real property.

2.

The Land Board is a constitutional board established by Article IX, Section 7 of

the Idaho Constitution, which is vested with the direction, control and disposition of Idaho's
public lands under Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution.
3.

Defendant George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho Department of Lands

("Department of Lands").

The Department of Lands is an agency of the state of Idaho,

established by the Idaho legislature to administer state lands. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-121,
Mr. Bacon is responsible for, among other duties, countersigning leases issued by the president
of the Land Board for rental of state endowment lands held for the benefit of public schools, state
nonnal schools and the state hospital.
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II.
JURlSDICTION aDd VENUE
4.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over all parties since they all either reside in

or do business in the state of Idaho.

5.

The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of this Court.

6.

The real property which is the subject of this case is located in Valley County.

7.

Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401.

Idaho.

III.
FACTS
The Land Board's Constitutional and Statutory Direction
8.

Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution directs the Land Board to provide

for the rental of aU state lands under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which
granted. or to the state if not specifically granted.
9.

Idaho Code § 58-304 gives the Land Board power to lease any portion of state

land at a rental amount fixed and determined by the Land Board. Per Idaho Code § 58-307,
leases issued by the Land Board for a site to be used for residential purposes may extend to
thirty-five (35) years.
10.

The Land Board defines a "cottage site" as any state-owned parcel of real

property which is leased for recreational residential purposes.

Plaintiffs' leases all concerned

cottage sites and the leases are hereinafter referred to as "the cottage site leases."
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11.

Idaho Code § 58-310 imposes a conflict application and auction process to be

applied when two or more persons apply to the Board to lease the same land. In such instances,
Idaho Code § 58-3 J0 requires the director of the Land Board to auction off and lease the land to
the applicant who will pay highest premium bid therefore. with the annual rent to be established
by the Land Board.

However, Idaho Code § 58-31OA provides that the conflict auction and

application procedure shall not apply to cottage site leases issued by the Land Board. Instead,
Idaho Code § 58-3 (OA directs the Land Board to ensure that each leased cottage site lot
generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease.
Tbe Terms of tbe CurreDtly ExistiDI Cottage Site Leases
12.

The Land Board entered into the currently existing cottage site leases for state

lands surrounding Payette Lake with plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest on
January I, 2001. The existing Jeases will tenninate on December 31, 2010. The Land Board
issued identical leases to all Plaintiffs, with identical lease provisions for each cottage site.
13.

The lease provides for a rental rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the

leased premises, as detennined by the valuation administered by the Land Board or the valuation
is detennined by the assessor. The rent is payable on or before January I of each year, and is
paid one year in advance.

Rent may increase or decrease effective January I of any ca1endar

year, in accordance with the 2.5% fonnula.
14.

For purposes of determining the appropriate rental rate, the cottage sites

are valued each five (5) years. The values are updated annually by indexing based on
market data. With regard to cottage sites surrounding Payette Lake, the Land Board will
rely on lot values as established by the Valley County Assessor.
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15.

The lease provides the Land Board shall not unreasonably withhold

approval of an existing lessee's request for renewal.
16.

If a request to renew is denied, the 'ease provides the Land Board will pay

the holder of the expiring lease for the approved improvements placed

00

the leased

premises. The improvements are to be valued based on the fair market value of the
improvements on the lease's expiration date.
] 7.

In the event of an ex.piration or tennioation of the lease for any reason

other than default by the lessee, and in the event Land Board leases the land to a new
lessee, the lease states the Land Board shall require the new lessee to pay the Land Board
for the value of the improvements. The Land Board may deduct any outstanding rent or
other monies due from the prior lessee, but then must disburse the remaining monies to
the prior lessee.
18.

The lease expressly states it is subject to all current and subsequently

enacted statutes, rules, regulations and laws applicable to state endowment lands or the
Jease, and that the Land Board shall comply with all applicable rules, regulations and
laws of the state 0 f Idaho or other governmental entities.
19.

The lease further provides that it is not subject to the conflict application

and auction procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 58·310.
20.

Based on the representations contained in the leases, indicating Plaintiffs

would be given a right to renew the leases on their current tenns, and that Plaintiffs
would be compensated for their approved improvements if their leases were not renewed
by the Land Board, Plaintiffs incurred substantial expense to purchase, construct and/or
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maintain valuable, pennanent approved improvements on the cottage sites.

These

improvements were made to allow Plaintiffs to put the cottage sites to residential use.
On March 16.2010, the Land Board decided to change all lease rates for

21.

the new tenn from 2.5% of land value to 4% of land value, with the] .5% increase phased
in over a 5-year period.

Plaintiffs Exercise Their Right to Renew The Existing Cottage Site Leases
22.

In early 2010, Plaintiffs infonned the Land Board, in writing, of their intent to

exercise their contractual and statutory rights to renew their existing site leases for an additional
10 year period, effective January I, 2011. Plaintiffs' notices sought renewal on the same tenns
set forth in the existing leases, with an annual rental rate at a reasonable and/or market rent, but
not to exceed 2.5% of the appraised or assessed value, whichever was less.
On March 12, IS, 16 and 17.2010, the Department of Lands sent Plaintiffs a form

23.

letter which was identical for all Plaintiffs, and stated that the Department had received
Plaintiffs' notices renewing their existing cottage site leases. The Department stated the new
lease terms to be offered to existing lessees had not yet been approved, and that Plaintiffs'
notices of renewal did not obligate the Department of Lands to continue the existing lease tenns.
The Department infonned Plaintiffs they would have the right-of-first-refusal to renew their
leases by either accepting or rejecting new lease terms that would be adopted by the Land Board
in March 2010.
24.

Thereafter, on or about March 31,2010, the Department of Lands mailed

Plaintiffs a cover letter, with a proposed lease for the cottage sites. The new lease contained the
4% rental rate (onnula approved by the Land Board at its March 16, 20 I 0 meeting. The letter
advised Plaintiffs that they had until April 30 to submit a renewal application and a $250.00
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nonrefundable application fee. The letter went on to state that in early fall 2010 the Land Board
would send new lease documents to those lessees that applied for renewal. The letter stated that
the previous renewal notices submitted by Plaintiffs did not obligate the Land Board to continue
the existing lease terms. By so informing Plaintiffs, the Land Board had unreasonably refused
renewal ofthe existing lease and required agreement to a new lease with new terms.
25.

Plaintiffs thereafter again gave written notice of their intent to renew. In

exercising their contractual and statutory right to renew their existing leases, Plaintiffs made
dear to the Department of Lands and the Land Board that they were exercising their right to
renew (for the new lease) under protest, and on the basis that the renewed leases should be made
on the basis of the existing lease terms.
26.

As of the filing of this Complaint, neither the Department of Lands nor the Land

Boaed have given any indication concerning whether they intend to renew the Plaintiffs' cottage
site leases.
27.

Based on the last correspondence Plaintiffs received from the Department of

Lands, dated March 31, 2010, which included a draft of the new lease, Plaintiffs believe the
renewal leases will contain new and different terms than those contained in the current leases,
including but not limited to the increased rental rate formula of 4% of land value.
/11/
1/1/

III/
1//1

/II/
/1/1
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IV.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT J - Breacb of Cootract/Specific PerformaDce
(RelatiDI to Existiol Cottage Site Leases)
28.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

29.

Plaintiffs entered into a vaJid contract with the Land Board to lease the cottage

sites in exchange for payment of annual rent for a JO-year period, with a right to renew under the
same lease tenns, including the same rental rate.
30.

Plaintiffs. with the approval of the Land Board and/or Department of Lands,

constructed and/or maintained valuable improvements on their leaseholds.
31.

Plaintiffs undertook said construction and maintenance in reliance on their right to

renew their existing leases, which right was granted by the lease tenns and by statute.
32.

The Land Board has breached the tenns of the contract by refusing to recogJ}ize

Plaintiffs' right to renew the lease contract under the same tenns, including the same rental rate.
33.

Plaintiffs sutTered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

lease contract
34.

Plaintiffs' legal remedies to compensate for and address the Land Board's breach

are inadequate due to the unique nature of the rea) property at issue.
35.

Plaintiffs therefore seek specific perfonnance of the existing cottage site leases,

including an Order directing the Land Board to execute new cottage site leases in favor of
Plaintiffs, renewing the leases for additional period(s) under the tenns present in the existing
leases, including the 2.5% rental rate.
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COUNT II - Breach of Contract
(An Alternate Claim for Purchase or Cottage Site Improvements}
36.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

37.

The existing cottage site leases provide that if Plajntiffs apply to renew their

leases and the Land Board refuses to renew the leases, the Land Board will purchase the
approved improvements placed on the leased premises by Plaintiffs, at the fair market value of
the improvements.
38.

The Land Board's refusal to renew the existing leases under the existing tenns,

including the existing rental rate, constitutes a refusal to renew the leases. Therefore, the Land
Board must pay Plaintiffs fair market value for the approved improvements constructed on their
respective lots.
39.

The Land Board has not made an offer or given any indication that it [ntends to

purchase the existing, approved improvements on Plaintiffs' cottage site leaseholds, thereby
breaching the tenns of its lease with Plaintiffs.
40.

Plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct result of the Land Board's breach of the

lease contract. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages from the Land Board.
41.

Plaintiffs, as the damaged parties, have the right to opt between remedies and

either: (a) obtain specific perfonnance and renewal of the existing cottage site leases, or (b)
obtain payment from the state for the fair market value of the approved improvements placed on
their respective leaseholds.

III1
I1I1
1111
III/
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COUNT III - Declaratory Judgmeat
(Regarding tbe Laad Board's ViolatioD oftbe Idaho CODstitutioD)
42.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

43.

The Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to raise cottage site rental rates to 4%

of property value does not secure the maximwn long-tenn financial return to the grantees of the
cottage sites and/or the state.
44.

By increasing the rental rate to 4%, the Land Board has imposed a rate in excess

of market rent, and discouraged leasing of the cottage sites, thereby decreasing the long-tenn
financial return to the grantees and/or the state compared to what is currently received from
Plaintiffs under the 2.5% rental rate fannula.
45.

Plaintiffs, as holders of cottage site leases granted by the Land Board, are

interested anellor affected parties under Idaho's Unifonn Declaratory Judgment Act, codified at
LC. §§ 10-1201 through 10-1217.
46.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article [X, Section 8 of the
Idaho Constitution.

COUNT IV - Declaratory Judgment
(Regarding tbe Land Board's Violation of I.C. § 58-310A)
47.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fulJy set forth herein.

48.

The 4% rental rate imposed by the Land Board does not constitute market rent for

the cottage sites in and around Payette Lake, but is instead in excess of current market rent.
49.

By increasing the rental rate to 4% and charging in excess of market rent, the

Land Board has failed to ensure stable leases of the cottage sites.
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50.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's

March 16,2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates I.e. § 58-3 lOA.

COUNT V - Dedaratory Jgdgment
(Regardinl tbe Land Board's Unconstitutional Applieation of I.C. § 58-310Al
51.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though funy set forth herein.

52.

The 4% rental rate is in excess of market rent, discourages leasing of the cottage

sites and fails to promote stable leases, as required by I.C. § 58-310A.
53.

The Land Board's decision to increase cottage site rental rates to 4% of property

value therefore fails to ensure the maximum long-term financial returns to the grantees and/or the
state.
54.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Land Board's March 16,

2010 decision to increase cottage site rental rates violates Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho
Constitution, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of I.C. § 5B-31 OA.

COUNT VI -Injunctive Relief
55.

Plaintiffs incorporate all previous allegations as though fully set forth herein.

56.

Plaintiffs will suffer great and/or irreparable injury in the event the Land Board is

allowed to institute the 4% cottage site rental rate because they will either lose the right to renew
their leases on the existing lease terms, or will lose their valuable improvements without
receiving fair and just compensation.
57.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an injunction against the Land Board and the

Department of Lands, prohibiting them from implementing the 4% rental rate, and directing
them to offer Plaintiffs new leases under the existing lease terms.
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VII.
CLAIM FOR ArrORNEY FEES AND COSTS
58.

Plaintiffs have been required to retain the services of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht &

Blanton, P.A. to prosecute this action, and have and will continue to incur reasonable attorney
fees and costs relative to their prosecution of this action.

59.

Plaintiffs allege and hereby make a claim against defendants for their costs and

reasonable attorney fees incUlTed pursuant to the provisions of the cottage site lease agreements
and Idaho Code § 12-117, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other contractual provision,
statute, rule or regulation providing for an award of attorney fees andlor costs in this action.
PAA YER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for declaration and judgment as follows:
/

I.

For a declaratory judgment that the March 16, 2010 decision of the Land Board is

.

unconstitutional, an unconstitutional application of I.e. § 58-110A andlor in violation of I.e. §
58-310A;
2.

For an Order enjoining the Land Board andJor the Department of Lands from

including in the renewed leases the new rental rate or any other terms that do not appear in
Plaintiffs' existing leases;
3.

For an Order directing the Land Board andlor the Department of Lands to provide

Plaintiffs with the option of either signing a lease renewal that is on the same terms as Plaintiffs'
existing leases, or pay Plaintiffs the fair market value of the approved improvements contained
on Plaintiffs' leased cottage sites;
4.

That, in the event the Court determines the Land Board is entitled to impose a

new rental rate formula on Plaintiffs, for an Order directing the Land Board to grant Plaintiffs the
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opportunity to exercise their right to renew their leases under the new rental rate fonnula
proposed by the Land Board in its March 31, 20 I 0 letter;
5.

That in the alternative, Plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be

detennined;

6.

That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in

prosecuting this action;
7.

That Plaintiffs be awarded the sum of $10,000 for attorney fees if this matter is

decided by default; and

8.

All other relief which the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this ~ day of November, 20] O.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

~\\.~

By:
Phillip S. Oberrecht - fthe Finn
Colleen D. lahn - Of the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Phillip S. Oberrecht
IS8 #1904, pso@hallfarJey.com

Colleen D. lahn

DEC 1 0 JafO

IS8 #6208, cdz@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone:
(208) 395-8500
Facsimile:
(208) 395-8585

J_ DAVID NAVAHRQ Clerk
9y 1:. HC~U=~ .
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Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,

I

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC 2010-23751

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO INTERVENE

vs.

C)

:::0

GJ

STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands
Defendants.

COME NOW, Proposed Defendants in Intervention, Babcock et al. ("Lessees"), by and
through the undersigned counsel, and state as follows in support of their Motion to Intervene:

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board") entered into leases (hereinafter
"the cottage site leases") with each of the Lessees.

The leases concern parcels of State

Endowment Land near and around Payette Lake. The Land Board drafted the leases, which are
for IO-year periods, beginning on January I, 2001 and ending on December 31, 2010.

See
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Affidavit ofW. Anthony Park ("Park Alf "), ~ 2 and Exh. A. The terms for each cottage site lease
were substantially similar, and each of the Lessees agreed to the lease terms contained in the
lease attached as Exhibit "A" to the Park Affidavit.
The leases provide Lessees with a right to renew the leases, and direct that the Land
Board will not unreasonably withhold its approval of an application to renew. See Park Aff,
Exh. A, §§ C.l.1 and K.1.4.b. The leases' renewal provisions were general, and did not set forth
any different terms for the renewal period, thereby indicating that the lease's general terms
would carryover in the event of a renewal. I f the Land Board denies a renewal application, the
lease requires the Land Board to compensate Lessees for the fair market value of Lessees'
improvements. See Id at § K.I.4.b.
On March 16, 2010, the Land Board voted to unilaterally impose a different rent term for
new leases beginning January 1, 20 ll. The change increased the rent formula from 2.5% of the
appraised value of the leasehold to 4% of a ten-year average of the appraised value. The increase
from 2.5% to 4% will be phased in over a 5-year period.
The Lessees timely applied to renew their existing cottage site leases in a \AtTiting sent to
the Department of Lands within the statutory time period, thereby satisfying the legal
requirements to renew their leases. See Id, ,4 and Exh. B. In doing so, the Lessees expressly
reserved their right to renew on the same terms as set forth in the existing lease, including the
existing rent formula of 2.5%. See Id The Department of Lands later notified the Lessees that it
refused to recognize Lessees' renewal notices, and stated that Lessees were required to fill out a
renewal application created by the Department of Lands, which is not a requirement imposed by
statute or the lease. See Id, , 5 and Exh. C. The Department also stated that renewal would only
be available on the terms offered by the Land Board in its entirely new lease. See Id.
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The March 31, 20 I 0 letter included what the Department called a "template" lease. See

Id. The template was watermarked with the word aTemplate" across the front of each page, did
not provide any identifying information specific to particular Lessees, and did not contain a
signature block. See Jd. The Department stated it would contact the Lessees should any action
be taken by the Land Board that would change the lease template, thus indicating the template
was simply a draft and potentially subject to further revision. See ld.

The Department also

indicated that in early fall it would send out lease documents for the new leases to those Lessees
that returned the Department of Lands' form. See ld.
Out of an abundance of caution and not wanting to give the Department of Lands a
reason to argue that Lessees failed to timely apply for renewal, Lessees returned the Department
of Lands' renewal form, reserving their rights to protest the imposition of a new lease on them by
the Department of Lands. See /d. at,; 6 and Exh. D. As of the date of this motion Lessees have
not received new leases. See Id. at

~

7. However, based on the statements contained in the

Department of Lands' March 31, 2010 letter and the actions of the Land Board on March 16,
2010, Lessees believe the new leases will contain new terms, including the increased rent
formula approved by the Land Board on March 16,2010. See Id.
In order to protect their lease rights, Lessees filed a lawsuit in the Fourth Judicial District
in Valley County on October 22, 2010, against the Land Board and Department of Lands. See
Zahn Al!, Exh. The VaHey County suit alleges two claims for breach of contract-one seeking
to compel specific performance of the renewal term. including continuation of the 2.5% rent
formula, and the alternative seeking compensation for site improvements due to the Land
Board's refusal to renew the current leases. See Exhibit A to Answer and Notice in Intervention,
~,

28-41.

[n addition, that lawsuit alleges the Land Board and Department of Lands have
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violated Idaho Code, Section 58-310A and Idaho Constitution Article IX, Section 8 by their
imposition of the new rent formula. See Id., ~~ 42-54. Although said allegations appear similar
to the allegations of the Attorney General in this case, they are in actuality quite different, for
they rest on the premise that the new rent formula requires rent payments that will be so high that
they will not promote stable leases at market rent and hence will not obtain maximum long-term
financial returns to the state. The parties have filed two dispositive motions in the Valley County
case, which have not yet been argued or decided: (1) a motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings,
filed by the defendants; and (2) a motion for partial summary judgment on the contract claims,
filed by Lessees.
On December 2, 2010, the Idaho Attorney General filed this suit against the Land Board
and Department of Lands, seeking relief including an injunction against the Land Board and
Department of Lands preventing them from renewing Lessees' cottage site leases unless those
renewals are subjected to conflict auctions. The Attorney General was well aware the Valley
County lawsuit was pending because over a month prior to filing the present lawsuit, the
Attorney General was served with copies of the Valley County lawsuit in his capacity as legal
representative of both the Department of Lands and the Land Board. See LR.C.P. 4(d)(5). For
unknown reasons, the Attorney General chose not to intervene in the Valley County litigation,
but instead to institute an entirely new lawsuit in a different county. Further, and despite being
aware that the Lessees were alleging contractual, statutory and constitutional claims relating to
the cottage site leases, the Attorney General failed to include as parties the very holders of the
leases subject to the statute he now seeks to have declared unconstitutional.
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II.
ARGUMENT

The Lessees have the right to and should be allowed to intervene in the instant suit, as
they have protected contractual rights in the leases that are the subject of this suit, and their
interests are not and cannot be represented by the parties already involved. The Lessees' claims
share questions of law and fact with Plaintiff Attorney Generals' claims in this suit, and the
outcome of this suit will likely affect Lessees' lease rights. Therefore, the court should allow the
Lessees to intervene and allow them to file their Answer and Notice in Intervention.

A.
LESSEES' MOTION AND PLEADING ARE TIMELY

Lessees are entitled to intervene in the instant action as a matter of right under LR.C.P.
24(a) or, in the alternative, are entitled to intervene upon pennission from the Court pursuant to
l.R.C.P. 24(b).

Intervention must be accomplished by a motion that is "accompanied by a

pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought." I.R.C.P 24(c).
Lessees have complied with this requirement by submitting contemporaneously herewith a
[Proposed] Answer and Notice in Intervention, as Exhibit A to the Motion to Intervene.
Intervention under either Rule 24(a) or 24(b) also requires timely application to the court.
The Idaho Supreme Court held a motion to intervene is timely unless the motion would "delay
the resetting of the case for trial to the serious detriment of the existing parties." Duff v. Draper,
96 Idaho 299, 302, 527 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1974). The present lawsuit was tiled only eight days
ago and, therefore, the instant motion would not cause serious detriment to the existing parties, is
timely and for the reasons set forth herein should be granted.
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B.
LESSEES' INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATE AS OF RIGHT
Idaho RuLe of Civil Procedure 24(a) permits anyone to intervene in a lawsuit as a matter
of right when:
[T]he applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that interest,.unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing

parties.
I.R.C.P.24(a)(2).
Intervention as of right is appropriate because the claims asserted by the Attorney
General relate to the cottage site leases that are the subject of the Lessees' lawsuit against the
Land Board and the Department of Lands. The Attorney General's claims against the Land
Board and Department of Lands directly affect the Lessees' continued enjoyment of the rights
granted by their leases. Should the Attorney General's requested relief be granted, the entire
process by which the cottage site leases are granted wouLd substantially change. The Lessees
have a substantial stake in maintaining a suit against the Attorney General in order to protect
their interest in their current leaseholds.
Lessees' interests, however, are inadequately represented in the instant litigation without
intervention. The Attorney General has no pecuniary interest in the leases at issue, but rather is a
member of the Land Board, the very entity he now seeks to litigate against. The Land Board is
the lessor of the properties at issue, drafted the cottage site leases, and now seeks to unilaterally
impose a new lease, including a new rent formula, on the Lessees. Accordingly, both the
Attorney General's interests and those of the Land Board and Department of Lands are adverse
to the interests of Lessees.
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The Lessees have their own unique and direct pecuniary and personal interests in the
leaseholds at issue and the improvements they 0\\'11 on said leaseholds. See Park Aff.,

~

6. The

Lessees have timely applied to renew their leases and, therefore, have a stake in protecting those
interests, which may be adversely affected should the Attorney General's requested relief be
granted. Therefore, as a practical matter, Lessees' ability to protect their interests would be
impaired or impeded if they were not permitted to intervene, and they should be al10wed to do so
as of right. I.R.C.P.24(a).
C.
LESSEES' INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATELY PERMITTED

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides for permissive intervention upon timely
application when an applicant's "claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common." I.R.C.P. 24(b)(2). Permissive intervention is appropriate in the instant action
because the Attorney General's claims against the Land Board and the Department of Lands
share common questions of law and fact with Lessees' claims against the Attorney General. All
of the claims arise out of the same cottage site leases. The Attorney General seeks to have the
leases subject to conflict auctions; the Land Board and Department of lands seek to change the
terms of their current lease agreements with Lessees; Lessees seek to enforce the current
agreements in compliance with Idaho Code, Section 58-310A and Article IX, Section 8 of the
Idaho Constitution. The Lessees' rights cannot be adequately represented by the existing parties,
and the Lessees should be permitted to intervene to protect their interests in the continued
enjoyment of the rights granted under their leases.
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III.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Lessees respectfully request that this Court grant them
leave to intervene as additional party defendants in this matter.
DATED this

@ ~ of December, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

Attorneys for Babcock et al.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
ti'day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of CiviL Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
954 W. Jefferson, 2 nd Floor
P a Box 83720
Boise. 10 83720
Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HA WLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

Fax No. 954-5210

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
l.!.J Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
D Telecopy (208) 854-8073
Email

o
o
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cieri>

Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026
D. John As.'1by, ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000

ByE. HOlMES
D£P\JTY

Facsimile: 208.954.5210

Email: mclark@bawleytroxell.oom
jashby@haw}eytroxel1.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex rei.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1023751
AFFlDAVIT OF GEORGE BACON

)

vs.

)
)

STATE BOARD OF LAND
COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON,
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho
Department of Lands,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

-------------)

GEORE BACON, being first d Jly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1

1.

I am the Director the Idaho Department of Lands. I make this affidavit based

upon my O\ffi personal knowledge, which is based, in part, on a review of the business records of
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Idaho Department of Lands that have been kept in the CDurse of the Idaho Department of Lands'
regular business activity, of which I share custodianship.
2.

In light of the suggestion in the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary

Injunction that the 2001 Leases be extended, I have calculated the amount of revenue that the
State ofIdaho would receive from the cottage site leases (1) under the new leases that the Land
Board intend to execute (the "New Leases"); and (2) under the leases executed in 2001 (the
"2001 Leases"), if those leases were extended beyond their December 3], 2010 termination date,
By my calculation, total revenues under the New Leases for the year 2011 would be

$4,632,956.74. lfthe 2001 Leases were extended, total revenues for the year 2011 would be
$4,403,863.87.
3.

The above calculations are based on the assumption that all cottage site lessees

execute the New Leases or agree to extend the 2001 Leases.

~~==~----------------..,.t....

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this~ day of December, 2010.

Name:
..;)/J...:514;+J ~'1
Notary Public for Idaho
....- t\
Residing at ,AI'"An'--fA ...J..-..I.J
My commission expires
30- ~O,

€'-

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a~y

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDA VIr OF GEORGE BACON by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
Steven L. Otsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

-x::..
Hand Delivered
_/_ Overnight Mail
E~mail

_ _ Te)ecopy: 208.854.8073

Clay R. Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
nd
954 W. Jefferson, 2 Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-00 to

Phillip S. Oberrecht
Colleen D. Zahn

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~ Hand Delivered

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.

_ _ Overnight Mail

702 West Idaho, Suite 700
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701

E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.395.8585
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LL
_ _ _ _F..JI~.t
~ l U~
O£C 1 3 2010
J, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
ByE. HOLMES
OEP\.ITY

Merlyn W, Clark, ISB No. l026
Stephen C. Smith, ISB No. 7336
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, 1D 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5210
Email: mclark@hawlcytroxeLl.com
scsmith@hawleytroxeLl.com
jashby@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

HOl\. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his
capacity as Attorney General ofIdaho, ex rel.
STATE ENDOWMENT LAND
BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)
)

STATE BOARD OF LAND

)

Case No. CV OC 1023751
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

)

COMMISSIONERS, and GEORGE BACON, )
in his official capacity as Director of the Idaho)
Department of Lands,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)
----------------------~-----
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The State Board of Land Commissioners and its director, George Bacon (collectively, the
"Land Board"), submit this memorandum in opposition to the Attorney General's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

I. INTRODUCTION
State endovvrnent lands known as "cottage sites" surrounding Payette Lake and Priest
Lake are currently leased pursuant to ten-year leases that terminate on December 31, 2010. To
fulfil1 its duty to maximize returns on endowment lands. the Land Board must enter into new
leases effective January I, 2011. The Land Board has been engaged in a multi-year process to
determine the rate to implement with the new leases taking effect on January 1, 2011. On March
16,2010 the Land Board voted 3-2 to implement a 4% Lease rate. l As required by statute, the
cottage site lessees have been put on notice of the terms of the new lease, and the Land Board
intends to, and is ready to, execute the new leases.
The Attorney General's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief challenges the
4% lease rate, but that challenge is not the basis of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction at issue
here. Instead, the only issue before the Court at this time is the Attorney General's request that
the Land Board be enjoined from executing the new leases. That request is based on the
eleventh·hour contention that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA, which exempts cottage site leases
from the "conflict auction" procedures that apply to all other endowment lands, is
unconstitutional.

The lease rate is more complicated than a simple percentage of land value in that it takes into
consideration the average value of the land over a 10 year period and also includes a
component of "premium rent." For the sake of simplicity, this memorandum generally refers
to the rental rate approved by the Land Board as the "4% lease rate." A more detailed
description of the 4% lease rate is set forth below.
MEMORANDCM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
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As an initial matter, fundamental principles of separation of pov.'ers do not allow the
Court to enjoin the actions of the Land Board or to order the Land Board to take any particular
action. Moreover, there would be no need for the Attorney General's eleventh-hour request for
injunctive relief if this action had been brought sooner. The Attorney General concluded in an
August of2009 advisory opinion that Idaho Code Section 58-310A is unconstitutional, yet no
action was brought at that time to have the statute declared unconstitutiona1. Instead, this action
was not filed until 29 days before the current leases terminate.
The Land Board takes no position with regard to the constitutionality of Idaho Code
Section 58-3] OA. The Land Board is required to comply with that statute unless and until it is
repealed by the legislature or is determined to be unconstitutional by the Court.
The Land Board respectfully asks the Court to deny the Attorney General's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. As set forth in more detail below, the injunction requested by the
Attorney General would only harm the endowment land beneficiaries. The current leases
terminate on December 31, 2010 and contain no provision for extension. Thus, an order
enjoining the Land Board from executing new leases would leave the cottage sites unleased and
would leave the endowment land beneficiaries without a source of revenue from the cottage
sites. The preliminary injunction would not provide a benefit to any party in that, regardless of
the Court's decision on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, no conflict auctions can occur
unless and until Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is declared unconstitutional.
J]. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

Background Of The "Cottage Site" Endowment Lands
The Idaho Department of Lands is the executive agency established to administer state

endowment lands. See I.e. § 58-LOl; 58·119. George Bacon is the Director of the Idaho
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Department of Lands. Complaint"

5. Under Article IX, § 8 of the Idaho Constitution, the Land

Board is the trustee of public schools, nonnal schools and state hospital endowment lands. The
Land Board consists of five members: the Attorney General, the Governor, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the Secretary of State and the State Controller. See Idaho Constitution,
Article IX, § 7; Idaho Code § 53-\01.
The Land Board is the trustee for almost 2.5 million acres of endowment lands granted to
Idaho at statehood for the purpose of supporting public schools and other public institutions. See
Affidavit of Bob Brammer, filed concurrently herewith ("Brammer Aff."), Exh. B. Idaho's
endowment trust assets include 354 lots on Priest Lake and] 68 lots on Payette Lake. Id. The
State leases the lots, and lessees are authorized to construct and own single-family residences on
the sites. Id The lots are generally referred to as "cottage sites."

B.

Constitutional and Statutory Background
Article IX, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the Land Board "shall have

direction, control and disposition of the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may
be prescribed by law." Article IX, Section 8 states that the Land Board shall provide for the sale
or rental of endowment lands "under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such
manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return."
With regard to the leasing of endo\\ment lands, the Land Board has express statutory
authority to determine lease rates. See I.C. § 58-304 ("The state board ofland commissioners
may lease any portion of the state land at a renta] amount fixed and determined by the board.").
Moreover, the Idaho Administrative Code grants the Land Board discretion to set the annual
lease rate for cottage site leases. See IDAPA § 20.03.13.026 ("Annual rental shall be set by the
board from time to time as they deem necessarv.") (emphasis added).
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To assist the Land Board in exercising its discretion, the Land Board is authorized to
"appoint and consult with expert advisors for each critical function for which the state board of
land commissioners has responsibility." I.C. § 58-104(12). One key tool given to the Land
Board for purposes of detennining an appropriate price at which to buy, sell or lease state lands
is the Land Board's authority to "cause all lands belonging to the state to be appraised, at such
times, in such manner and by such means as the board shall decide."

I.e. § 58-301.

The Land

Board has broad discretion with regard to the appraisals. Id. ("All appraisements are under the
contra] of the board, which may approve or disapprove of the same, in whole or in part .... ").

C.

Background of Conflict Auctions and Idaho Code Section 58-310A
Until 1990, all endowment lands, including cottage sites, were subject to "conflict

auctions" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 58-310. A "conflict auction" would be triggered
whenever two or more parties submit applications to lease the same land. In such a case, the
Department of Lands would auction off and lease the land to the applicant who offered to pay the
highest premium bid for the lease. ld
[n ] 990, the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, which exempted cottage

site leases from the conflict auction procedures. There have been no conflict auctions on cottage
site leases since enactment of Idaho Code § 58·31 OA.

D.

Action Taken By The Land Board To Determine The Cottage Site Rental Rate That
Will Maximize Long-Term Returns On Endowment Lands
The cottage sites are currently leased pursuant to ten-year leases that were executed in

2001 and expire on December 31,2010 (the "2001 Leases"). See Brammer Aff., Exh. A. The

2001 Leases provide for annual rent of2.5% of the fee simple value of the leased premises,
adjusted annually based on appraised value (in the case of Priest Lake cottage sites) and assessed
values detennined by VaHey County (in the case of Payette Lake cottage sites). Id.
MEMORANDUM fN OPPOSITION TO MOTlO~ FOR PRELIMfNARY
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In recognition of the fact that the 2001 Leases expire on December 3 I, 2010, the Land
Board has been working for several years to determine the appropriate terms for new leases to go
into effect on January 1, 2011. The Land Board began this process in 2007 by establishing a
Cottage Site Subcommittee (the "Subcommittee"), whieh consists of Secretary of State Ben
Ysursa and Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna. Brammer Aff, Exh. B.
In an attempt to determine a rental rate that wou1d maximize long-term financial returns,
the Land Board commissioned several appraisals of the cottage sites and sought the
recommendations of several experts as to appropriate lease rates. See id. at Exh. B. After
considering the various appraisals and reports, and after conducting several public meetings to
consider comments from interested parties, the Subcommittee made a recommenda1ion to the

Land Board. proposing the following lease rate:
A target annual lease rent ('"target rent") will be calculated at 4.0%
of the average appraised value of each lot over the most recent 10
years (the sum of the i 0 prior years appraised or indexed values for
each lot divided by 10). Actual rent will increase or decrease
annually from the prior year's rent at a constant percentage rate to
reach the target rent in year five. Every five years from the
effective date of the lease, the actual rent will be recalculated using
this same methodology and appraised values of the lot for the most
recent 10 years. Lot values shall be appraised by the applicable
county assessor or determined by an Idaho Certified Appraiser, at
the discretion of the Department. At the end of each five year
period under the lease, the target rent will be calculated at 4.0% of
the average value for the duration of the lease.
ld The Subcommittee opined that this rental rate, when combined with a component of
"premium rent," would "have the effect of maximizing the return to the beneficiaries, and that

any higher rate would be counterproductive .... " ld.
During the several meetings leading up to a vote on the terms of the new lease, the
Attorney General voiced his objections to the 4% lease rate. See Brammer Aff., Exh. C. He did
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not, however, make any proposal for different terms. ld On .Y1.arch 16,2010, in a 3-2 vote, the
Land Board approved the Subcommittee's recommendation to implement a 4% lease rate. See
Brammer Aff., Exh. C, p. 36-37.
The Land Board is statutorily required to give 6 months notice prior to increasing lease
rates. See Idaho Code § 58-304. Accordingly, on March 3], 2010, the Idaho Department of
Lands mailed each cottage site lessee an Application for Use form (the "Application"), which
included a cottage site lease template for a term beginning January 1, 20 It, with the "rental rate
provisions approved by the [Land Board] at their March 16, 2010 meeting." See Brammer Aff,
Exh. D (page 1 of Jetter and page 2 of Template Cottage Site Lease).

E.

Procedural Background
On March 24, 20lO, the Attorney General filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the

ldaho Supreme Court. See Affidavit ofO. John Ashby, filed concurrently herewith ("Ashby
Aff."), Exh. A. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition sought to enjoin the Land Board from
"signing and implementing so-called 'cottage leases' for rental of state endowment lands held in
trust for the public schools, normaJ schools and the Idaho State Hospital ... unless and until they
are leased under terms meeting the requirements of Idaho Constitution, Article IX, § 8." Id. at p.
2. Specifically, the Attorney General asserted that the Land Board's March 16,2010 decision to

implement the 4% lease rate was "in excess of its jurisdiction" because it does not "return the
maximum long term financial return" to the state as required by Article IX, Section 8 of the
ldaho Constitution and because it does not "insure that each leased lot generates market rent
throughout the duration of the lease" as required by Idaho Code § 58-3 lOA. See id. at Exh. B, p.

3-4. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition did not seek any declaration that Idaho Code § 58-310A
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was unconstitutional. To the contrary, it presumed for purposes of the Writ of Prohibition that
Idaho Code § 58-31 OA was constitutiona1. Jd. at p. 4.
The Land Board sought dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Prohibition, asserting that the
Land Board's decision fell within its discretion. On December 1,2010, the Idaho Supreme Court
issued an opinion dismissing the Writ of Prohibition on grounds that the Attorney General has
another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary Course of law." See Wasden v.

Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners,

-~.

P.3d ---, 2010 WL 4861713 (Idaho, 2010).

Certain Payette Lake cottage site lessees (the "Payette Lake Lessees") have filed a
separate action in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of VaHey. Ashby Aff., Exh. C. That action asserts that the 4% lease rate violates
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code Section 58-310 because that rate is above market rent. Id.
On December 2, 2010 - just 29 days before the new ten-year leases are to take effect the Attorney General filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks to enjoin the Land Board
from executing the new ten-year leases.

III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
The party seeking an injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto. Harris v.

Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 5]8, 681 P.2d 988,993-994 (1984). As the Idaho Supreme Court
stated in Harris, "a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the
right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." /d, 106 Idaho
at 5] 8.
In BOise Development Cu .. v. Idaho Trust & Savings Bank, 24 Idaho 36, 49,133 P. 916,
919 (1913), the Court noted that "injury, material and actual, and not fanciful or theoretical, or
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merely possible, must be shown as the necessary or probable result of the action sought to be
restrained." Furthermore, the Court has held that, "the substantial likelihood of success
necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot exist
where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." Harris, 106 Idaho at

518 (citations omitted).
In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, courts commonly consider the
"balance of hardships." See. e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v, Vill, a/Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,542 (1987)

("In each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect
on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested [preliminary injunctive] relief.");

Farm Serv,. Inc, v. United States Steel Corp., 90 Idaho 570, 586, 414 P.2d 898 (1966) ("These
considerations [relating to the harm the plaintiff claims would result in the absence of a
preliminary injunction] should be weighed against the injury which may result to the defendant
during the pendency of the action by the imposition of the temporary injunction, in case it should
finally be determined that plaintiff was not entitled thereto."). Balancing the hardships involves
comparing the harm the plaintiff would suffer if an injunction were not entered with the harm the
defendant would suffer if an injunction were entered, Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542; Farm Serv .• 90
Idaho at 586.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Fundamental Principles Of Separation Of Powers Prohibit The Court From
Enjoining A Co-Equal Brancb Of The Government
Before addressing the merits of this action, the Court should first recognize the

extraordinary relief sought here by the Attorney General. In this Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, the Attorney General is not asking the Court to review the validity of leases that have
already been entered into, but rather is asking the Court to enjoin the Land Board from acting in
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its constitutionally and statutorily granted role as trustee of the endowment lands. Principles of
separation of power do not allow the Court to enjoin a co-equal branch of the government. In

Miller v. Meredith, 83 P.2d 206, 207 (Idaho 1938), the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
It seems to us that to keep within the spirit of our Constitution,
(article 2, § 1) and form of government, which recognizes the
independence and specific character ofthe 'three distinct
departments' of government, that the judicial department could not
attempt to prohibit either of the other departments from acting
within the recognized scope of their respecti ve branches of the
government, but that, on the other hand, the legal effect of such
action after it has been taken may be inquired into by the court.
Jd. (citations omitted).

In other words, while the Court may review actions already taken by other branches of
government, the Court should not direct a co-equaJ branch of government in how it should act
within the scope of its authority. Id. ~ see also Stale of Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 500

(i866) ("The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President is the
executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though
the acts of both, when perfonned, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance."); Idaho Schools

for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450, 460, 129 P.3d l199, 1209 (2005)
(explaining that the Court will not instruct the legislature on how to fund education, but that it
would review future legislative action taken).
Article IX, Section 7 ofthe Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code Section 58-304 grant
authority to the Land Board to lease endowment lands. It is not the role of the Court to instruct
the Land Board in how to carry out that duty (i.e., by ordering it to "extend" the 2001 Leases as
requested by the Attorney General) or to preliminarily enjoin the Land Board from executjng
new leases. Once the Land Board has executed new leases, the Court may review the action of
the Land Board. Indeed, while the Court's review of the Land Board's action is limited, the
MEMORAKDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELlMINARY
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Court might even invalidate leases entered into by the Land Board, but the Court should not
preliminarily enjoin the Land Board or order it to perform any act.
B.

The Land Board Takes No Position With Regard To The Constitutionality Of Idaho
Code § 58-310A
The Attorney General's Complaint challenges (1) the constitutionality of Idaho Code

Section 58-31 OA and (2) the Land Board's March 16, 20 I 0 decision to implement the 4% lease
rate.2 The Motion for Preliminary Injunction, however, is based exclusively on the
constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58·31 OA. See Brief in Support of Motion for
Pre1iminary Injunction, p. 2.
For purposes of this Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Land Board takes no position
with regard to the constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA. That statute is not the Land
Board's to defend.3 However, as Constitutional officers of the State, the. Land Board is
obligated to follow Idaho Code Section 58·31 OA unless and until it is repealed by the legislature
or invalidated by a Court.

C.

The Motion For Preliminary Injunction Should Be Denied Because It Would Cause
More Harm Tban Good

I.

Granting The Preliminary InjuDdion Will Provide No Benefit To Any Party

2 The second and third claims for relief each challenge the March 16, 20 10 decision. More
specifically, the second claim asserts that the Land Board's action violates Article IX.
Section 8 of the ldaho Constitution, and the third claim asserts that the Land Board's action
violates Idaho Code Section 58-310A (alleged in the alternative, in the event that the Court
concludes that Idaho Code Section 58-3 lOA is constitutional).

3

As the Attorney General has noted, the duty to defend the validity of legislative action
generally falls on the Attorney General. See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, p. 2. Given that the Attorney General is challenging the constitutionality of Idaho
Code Section 58-31 OA, it is unclear who, if anyone, will defend the statute. The Land Board
reserves its rights to take a position at a later date.
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The Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction asks the Court to enjoin the
Land Board "from entering into new ten-year cottage site leases until the constitutionality of
Idaho Code § 58-310 has been resolved." See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, p. 3. As an initial matter, an order preliminarily enjoining the Land Board trom
executing new leases will provide no benefit to any party. For purposes of the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, this Court is asked to detennine only the likelihood that the Attorney
General will prevail on the merits of his contention that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is
unconstitutional. No final ruling as to the constitutionality of the statute can be made at this
preliminary stage of the litigation. A final determination of the constitutionality of Idaho Code
Section 58-3 lOA can be made only upon a motion pursuant to I.R.c.P. 12 or 56.
The constitutionality of Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA was not at issue in the recent
Petition for Writ of Prohibition. Nevertheless, Justice Burdick opined in his dissenting opinion
that the statute is unconstitutional. In doing so, he also explained that the Land Board is required
to follow Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA unless and until it is declared unconstitutional:
Although not argued by any party here, I.C. § 58-31OA is clearly
unconstitutional as - in eliminating the conflict auction procedure
and instead requiring "market rent" - the legislature encroached
upon the discretion constitutionally granted to the Land Board ....
However, until declared unconstitutional, I.C. § 58-31 OA must still
be followed by the Land Board.

Wasden v. Idaho Stale Board of Land Commissioners, 20]0 WL 4861713 (J. Burdick,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
The whole point of the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is that the

Land Board should not enter into leases that are not subject to conflict auctions. At this
preliminary stage of the litigation, this Court can assess the likelihood of success on the merits,
but it cannot declare Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA to be unconstitutional. Even if this Court

MEMORAj'l'DCM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION - 12
4509·J.0003 2163172 ,

165

were to grant the Attorney General's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Land Board would
still be required to follow Idaho Code Section

58~3

lOA unless and until a final determination has

been made that the statute is unconstitutional. Accordingly, no matter the result of the pending
motion, no cottage site lease can be subject to conflict auction, at least not until some time after
the January 1,20 II effective date of any new lease.
Finally, even if Jdaho Code Section 58-31 OA were to be declared unconstitutional right
now, there still would be no way to implement conflict auctions for purposes of any lease taking
effect on January 1, 2011. The statutory deadline for submitting applications that would trigger a
conflict auction with regard to the new leases has already passed. See Idaho Code Section 58307 (hAll applications to lease or to renew an existing lease which expires December 3l of any
year, shall be filed in the office of the director of the department oflands by the thirtieth day of
April preceding the date of such expiration.").

2.

Enjoining The Land Board From Executing New Leases Would Harm The
Endowment Land Beneficiaries

Any injunction prohibiting the Land Board from executing the new leases would have a
detrimental effect on the revenue generated by the cottage sites. Simply stated, an order
enjoining the Land Board from executing the new leases would result in the cottage sites going
unleased when the current leases expire on December 31,2010. Without leases in place, the
cottage sites will not earn any revenue. The absence of revenue harms the endowment land
beneficiaries and prevents the Land Board from complying with its duty to maximize returns on
endowment lands.
The Attorney General contends that "[t]he preliminary injunction, if granted, will do
nothing more than preserve the status quo during the pendency of this litigation." See Brief in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 3. That contention is simply incorrect. The
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status quo is that the cottage sites are leased, without conflict auctions, until December 31, 2010.

If the Land Board is enjoined from entering into new leases, the cottage sites would be left
unleased, which is neither the status quo nor in anyone's best interests.
The Attorney General implies that an injunction from executing new leases would result
in an extension of the 2001 leases. See Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p.
3 ("The attorney general does not seek relief that would restrain the Land Board from taking
appropriate action to extend existing leases pending final resolution of the challenge to § 583IONs constitutionality.") (emphasis added), The Attorney General is mistaken that the Land
Board can simply "extend" the prior leases. The 2001 Leases expressly provide that they
"terminate December 31, 2010." See Brammer Aff., Exh. A, signature page (emphasis added).
The 2001 Leases contain no provision that would allow them to be extended as proposed by the
Attorney General. Jd.
Even if the Land Board could somehow "extend" the 200] Leases despite the clear
provision that they "terminate" on December 31. 2010, an extension of the new leases even for
just one year would cost the endowment beneficiaries $229,092.87. See Affidavit of George
Bacon, filed concurrently herewith ("Bacon Aff."), ~ 2. Under the new leases, total revenues
from the cottage sites would be $4,632,956.74. ld If the 200] Leases were extended, total
revenues would be $4,403,863.87. ld.
Enjoining the Land Board from entering into new leases would not only leave the cottage
sites unleased, but it would subject the State of Idaho to a risk of liability to the cottage site
lessees. The 2001 Leases provide:
Should LESSEE apply to renew this lease in the manner provided
by law and such application be denied. then LESSOR shall
purchase the approved improvements placed or caused to be placed
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on the leased premises by LESSEE, at the fair market value of
such improvements as of the effective date of expiration.
Brammer Aff., Exh. A, ~ l.4.b.
If the Land Board does not execute new leases, the State of Idaho may be required to
purchase from the lessees the improvements on the cottage sites. In other words, the State of
Idaho may be required to pay fair market value for the homes that have been built on the 500+
cottage sites. The Payette Lake Lessees have already asserted in their separate lawsuit against
the Land Board that the Land Board's failure to issue a lease on the terms to which the Payette
Lake Lessees believe they are entitled will trigger the State ofldaho's obligation to purchase the
cottage site improvements. Ashby Aff., Exh. C. While the Land Board disagrees with this
position, an order prohibiting the Land Board from executing a new lease will only strengthen
the Payette Lake Lessees' position that the State of Idaho must purchase the improvements on
the cottage sites. 4

D.

This Eleventh-Hour Request For Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied As Untimely
Courts routinely deny preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs who delay in seeking it.

See. e.g., Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th CiT. 1985)
("Plaintiffs long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and
irreparable hann."); Lydo Enters.. inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d ]2] 1, 12I3~14 (9th Cir.

] 984) ("A delay in seeking a preliminary injunction is a factor to be considered in weighing the
propriety of relief. '"

4

A preliminary injunction is sought upon the theory that there is an urgent

This argument should not be construed as an admission that the State of Idaho will have to
purchase the improvements on the cottage sites if enjoined from issuing ne,,,,' leases. Such a
determination would have to be made by a Court. The point is that an injunction may have
far~reaching consequences that are potentially detrimental to the State of Idaho.
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need for speedy action to protect the plaintiffs rights. By sleeping on its rights, a plaintiff
demonstrates the lack of need for speedy action.") (citations omitted).
The Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA in 1990. The statute has
now been in effect for more than 20 Yl;'ars without challenge. The alleged unconstitutionality of
the statute is not a new development. The Attorney General issued an advisory opinion more
than 16 months ago opining that "[a] reviewing court likely would conclude the Idaho
Legislature does not have the authority to exempt leases of state endowment lands for singlefamily recreational cottage sites and homesites from the public auction requirement of Article
IX, § 8, of the Idaho Constitution." See Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 09-1, 2009 WL 2588327
(August 5, 2009). Despite his conclusion that Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA is unconstitutional,
the Attorney General did not bring an action challenging the statute at that time.
On March 24, 2010, the Attorney General filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the
ldaho Supreme Court. That action challenged the Land Board's Marcb 16, 2010 decision to
implement the 4% rental rate, but it did not challenge the constitutionality ofIdaho Code § 58310A. To the contrary, the Petition for Writ of Prohibition expressly presumed the
constitutionality of that statute. See Ashby Aff., Exh. B, p. 4 ("The Attorney General presumes
the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA for the purpose of this Petition, notwithstanding
Attorney General Opinion 09-01 (2009), which concludes that Idaho Code § 58-310A is an
unconstitutional infringement on the Board's constitutional duty to employ public auctions for
leases of endO\vment lands.")
The constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA could have been challenged long ago. If
the Attorney General had brought this action in August of 2009 the constitutionality of the
statute could have been decided on the merits prior to the January] , 2011 effective date of the
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new leases. Instead, the Attorney General waited until December 2, 2010 - just 29 days before
the 200 I Leases terminate - to bring this action. The delay in bringing this action warrants the
denial of preliminary injunctive relief.

V. CONCLUSION
The Land Board is ready and able to execute new leases to go into effect on January 1,
2011, which it must do to comply with its duty to maximize returns on endowment lands. The
Land Board \\ill execute the new leases unless enjoined from doing so by the Court. For the
foregoing reasons, the Land Board respectfully asks this Court to deny the Attorney General's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and allow the Land Board to carry out the action that it voted
to take at the March 16, 20 I 0 Land Board Meeting.

DATED THIS

Jl

day of December, 2010.

HA WLEY TROXELL EN'NIS & HAWLEY LLP

BY~;B

No. 1026

Stephen C. Smith, ISB No. 7336
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
Attorneys for Defendants
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INTRODUCTION
Defendants (collectively "Land Board" or "Board") make no effort to defend the
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31OA in opposing the Attorney General's motion for
preliminary injunction. They claim that the "statute is not the Land Board's to defend." Opp'n
Mem. at 11. This claim is remarkable given the Board's unquestioned fiduciary duty under
Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution not only "to provide for the Location, protection,
sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted to or acquired by the
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state by or from the general government" for the purpose of securing "the maximum long tenn
financial return to" the affected beneficiaries but also to ensure that that the Legislature honors

its responsibility to "provide by law that the general grants of land made by congress to the state
shall be judiciously located and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public
auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants of land were made."
See Barber Lumber Co. v. Gifford, 25 Idaho 654, 666, 139 P. 557, 561 (1914) ("[t]he grant of
lands for the various purposes by the federal government to the state constitutes a trust and the
state board of land commissioners is the instrumentality created to administer that trust, and is
bound upon principles that are elementary to so administer it as to secure the greatest measure of
advantage to the beneficiary of it"). The Land Board, in other words, is not a junior officer
charged with simply doing what it is told. It has an independent and affinnative duty by virtue
of its constitutionally-imposed fiduciary status to measure those instructions against, inter alia,
the mandates in Article IX. Section 8.
The truth, of course, is that the Land Board does not attempt to defend § 58-310A
because the statute cannot be defended. The la"..·• insofar as it creates a special dispensation for
the cottage sites from the public auction requirement. plainly violates Article IX, Section 8. The
Board instead opposes the requested preliminary injunction primarily on the basis that the
proposed 201 ]-2020 Lease will generate approximately $229,000 more in rent over its first year
than the current lease arrangement and that. if the requested injunctive relief were granted, the
cottage sites would remain "unleased" after December 31, 2010 and the State would be exposed
"to a risk of liability to the cottage site lessees" in the fonn of purchasing approved
improvements. Opp'n Mem. at 14.
These arguments-even were they relevant for purposes of a preliminary injunction
issued under I.R.c.P. 65(e)(1)--do not withstand even cursory scrutiny for at least two reasons.
First, the Land Board not only has the opportunity hut aJso the duty at its December 21, 2010
meeting to detennine a course of action that ensures compliance with Article IX, Section 8, and
thereby avoid the need for further judicial involvement in the fonn of injunctive relief. Second,
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the Board's position will be no better, and very likely much worse, if it is forced to deal with a
determination concerning § 58-3 lOA's unconstitutionality after cottage site leases for the 20102020 period are fully executed and in place. The Board, in short, has temporized far too long
over dealing with the patent inconsistency between Article IX, Section 8 and § 58-310A. No
purpose is served by putting off the task of bringing management of the cottage site leases into
constitutional compliance.

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1) ONLY REQUIRES THE MOVANT TO ESTABLISH A
SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS WITH RESPECT
TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The Land Board relies upon Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P .2d 988

(1984), for the proposition that preliminary injunctive relief sought under lC.R.P. 65(e)(I)
requires, in addition to a likelihood of success on the merits, proof of irreparable hann if re1ief

pendente lite js not granted. Opp'n Mem. at 8. The Board misreads Harris.
The plaintiff in Harris sought relief under both paragraphs (l) and (2) of Rule 65(e). The
Court stated concerning the first paragraph:
(A]s to LR.C.P. 65(e)(l) appellants did not demonstrate that based on their
complaint, they were entitled to the relief they demanded, and as such were likely
to prevail at trial. The substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate
that appellants are enticled to the relief they demanded cannot exist where
complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt.
106 Idaho at 518,681 P.2d at 993. The Court turned then to subsection (e)(2) and held:
Neither have appellants carried their burden of proof under I.R.C.P.
65(e)(2). We have previously stated that "a preliminary mandatory injunction is
granted only in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." ... The district court's findings state
that: "[tlhe evidence clearly indicates that neither of the named plaintiffs nor, for
that matter, any of the other proposed plaintiffs whose records were presented are
in danger of any irreparable damage." We agree. The evidence indicated that the
April 12, 1982, action of the board of county commissioners of Cassia County
had been reversed and brought current prior to argument on appellants' motion for
the preliminary injunction. In fact, at the time of oral argument, neither appellant
had a pending or unpaid application before Cassia County for indigent aid.
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ld. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Land Board quotes the italicized portion of the
second sentence in the Court's discussion and improperly attempts to transform it into a
limitation on relief authorized by the explicit language of subsection (e )(l). I
The Board does not advance its effort at importing an irreparable harm requirement into
subsection (e)(1) by citation to decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Opp'n Mem. at 9. The Idaho
and federal rules depart dramatical1y from each other with respect to preliminary injunctions,
with the latter containing nothing similar to LR.C.P. 65(e). Although the Supreme Court has
counseled that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed "as uniformly as possible"
because the objective underlying Idaho's adoption of the federal rules ''\vas to establish a
uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho"

(Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 1] I Idaho 270, 275, 723 P.2d 814, 819 (1986)), it has limited that
preference to instances where the state rules have been drawn from their federal counterparts.
Thus, in Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001), it explained:
The above-quoted language in Chacon stated our preference for interpreting the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in confonnance with the interpretation placed upon the
same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations in
which our rules and the federal rules contain identical language. The relevant wording
of Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure now differs from that of the
corresponding federal rule, and therefore the interpretations of the two rules will differ.
There is no basis for hoMing that the phrase "within the period provided by law for
commencing the action" contained in the Idaho rule should have the same meaning as
the phrase "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and
complaint" now contained in the federal rule.

The Board relies selectively upon dissent in Wasden ex reI. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land
Comm'rs, 2010 Idaho No. 128, 2010 WL 4861713 (Dec. 1, 2010), insofar as Justice Burdick
addressed Rule 65(e). He observed that "the only possible basis upon which Wasden could
obtain a preliminary injunction is I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1)[] and it is far from certain that Wasden would
be entitled to relief under that section." Jd., 2010 WL 4861713, at *10. He rejected the
applicability of subsection (e)(2) because, in his view, "it is obvious that there is no injury to
Attorney General Wasden in this case." Jd. The Attorney General disagrees over the lack of
injury to the endowment lands' beneficiaries, but the dissent may have directed this analysis to
the Attorney General acting other than as a representative for the beneficiaries. In any event,
Justice Burdick did not incorporate the irreparable harm requirement in subsection (e)(I).
1
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136 Jdaho at 796, 41 P.3d at 224. Here, neither the irreparable hann nor the "balance of
hardships" factor identified as an element of preliminary injunction decision-making by federal
courts has application to injunction issued under LR.C.P. 65(e)(1).
II.

CONSIDERATION OF IRREPARABLE HARM AND "BALANCE OF
HARDSHIPS" FACTORS DOES NOT ASSIST THE LAND BOARD
Even were irreparable harm or the "balance of hardships" relevant criteria under the

Idaho rule, the result here would not change. Indeed, those considerations counsel strongly
against the Board's position.
The Land Board fully understands that the proposed leases are to be issued without
compliance with the constraints on its authority in Article IX, Section 8.

The cottage site

endov;ment lands' beneficiaries, moreover, have an entitlement to the benefit of the bargain
struck by the Constitution's framers. It has long been settled that "[v]iolations of a litigant's
constitutional rights constitute "irreparable hann per se" and tbat "[n]o other injury is required
for an injunction provided that the other necessary ingredients to relief are present." N. Pa.
Legal Servs., Inc. v. County of Lackawanna, 513 F. Supp. 678, 687 (M.D. Pa. 1981). Another

federal district court has observed that U[i]t has repeatedly been recognized by the federal courts
at all levels that violation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law."
Cohen v. Coahoma County, 805 F. Supp. 398, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1992). It warrants emphasis that

the rights at issue here are "personal" to the extent that they attach to particular beneficiaries and
that, as discussed above, the Board administers the cottage sites as a trustee who must make
decisions consonant with maximizing long tenn financial returns through public auction-the
constitutional vehicle for achieving those returns. See Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd.,
133 Idaho 64, 67-68, 982 P.2d 367,370-71 (1999).
As for "balance of hardships," the Board asks this Court to draw a very difficult calculus
to conclude that a patent, and essentiaIly admitted, violation of Article IX, Section 8 is
outweighed in some fashion by the wholly conjectural loss of $229,000 in rent might be
experienced in 2011. The Board neglects to acknowledge that it has at its December 21 meeting
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not only the opportunity but also the power to limit lease tenns to one year, see Idaho Code §

58~

307( 1), and to begin the process of satisfying the requirement attendant to conducting an auction
if necessary, see id. § 58-310. The Attorney General does not request in this motion relief
compelling any specific response from the Board and, instead, only seeks an injunction that will
free the Board

[0

chart a path consistent with its constitutionaJ mandate under Article IX, Section

8. He does not, in panicular, ask the Court to direct that existing leases be continued. Exactly
how to address the consequences attendant to a prohibition against issuing the leases prepared in
response to the March 16, 2010 directive to Defendant Bacon is a matter firmly committed to the
Board in the first instance.
The Land Board's discussion of "[p ]rinciples of separation of powers" accordingly adds
nothing germane to resolution of the present motion. Opp'n Mem. at 10. Again, the Attorney
General has not requested this Court to issue relief mandating the Board to fashion a specific,
otherwise discretionary response to a preliminary injunction pTOhibiting execution of the
previously-prepared ten-year leases. This matter differs in no respect from other instances where
state officials or agencies are subject to equitable relief that precludes a constitutional or
statutory violation. As such, it fits squarely within Miller v. Meredith, 59 Idaho 385, 83 P.2d 206
(1938), where the Supreme Court affirmed a district judgment determining that the State Board
of Pardons had altered unconstitutionally a prisoner's sentence.
FinaJly, the Land Board's characterization of this action as an "eleventh hour" request
substitutes rhetoric for fact. Opp'n Mem. at 15-17. The Board is well aware of the inconsistency
between Article IX, Section 8 and § 58-3 lOA. That it views the merits of the Attorney General's
substantive claim compelling resulted in the Board's declination, when offered the opportunity,
to come forward with any argument contrary to the analysis in the brief supporting the
preliminary injunction motion. The Land Board had, and has, a continuing duty to carry out its
endowment-land management duties in a fashion congruent with Article IX, Section 8. It cannot
be heard to complain of dilatory tactics when called upon to act constitutionally. Rather, it is the
dilatory tactics of the Board in creating procedural hurdles that has led to the current situation.
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,

.

The Land Board's feigned concern over the loss of $229,000, given the millions of dollars that
the beneficiaries stand to lose if its unconstitutional course of conduct continues, is remarkable.

CONCLUSION
The motion for pre1iminary injunction should be granted,
Dated this 14th day of December 2010.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTOR.NEY GENERAL

BY~·
'CAYRSMITH
Deputy Attorney General
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Attorneys for Proposed Defendants in Intervention

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HON. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his capacity
as Attorney General of Idaho, ex reI. STATE
ENDOWMENT LAND BENEFICIARIES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-OC 2010·23751
(

ORDER TO ALLOW BABCOCK
ETAL.TOINTERVENE

vs.
STATE BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS,
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court on December 15, 20 I 0, pursuant to the Motion to
Intervene and supporting documents filed by Babcock, et. aI., the holders of Payette Lake
Cottage Site Lessees identified on the [Proposed] Answer and Notice of Intervention.

The

Lessees were represented by their counsel, Phillip S. Oberrccht of the firm Hall, Farley,
Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. The Attorney General was represented by Deputy Attorney General
Clay Smith. The State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands were
represented by their counsel of record, Merlyn W. Clark of the firm Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP.
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The Court having considered the Motion to Intervene and supporting documents, the
[Proposed] Answer and Notice in Intervention, the arguments of counsel, the law and rules of
this Court, and being otherwise fully advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. The Lessees
are directed to file their Answer and Notice of Intervention within five (5) days of the date of this
Order.
DATED this

J1t2

day of December, 20 I O.
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DUCHARME REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST;
ALLEN and DIXIE DYKMAN; WENDY
EDMUNDS;
ROBERT
and
BARBARA
FARBER; JOSEPH J. FEELEY; MICHAEL AND
PATRICIA FERY; DAVID LEE FOLTZ; JOHN
W. GENTRY; GER.."vfAIN R. TARRANT and
JANET L. KELL; HOWARD C. GOUL;
RONALD and STACY L. GUILL; STEVEN M.
HAGER~ JAMES E. HANCOCK; KEVIN R.
HANIGAN, as trustee of the HANIGAN-ECKES
CABIN REVOCABLE LlVING TRUST; LILA
HARPER;
RODNEY
HEATER;
KENT
MICHAEL HENRJKSEN and JEANNE C.
HENRIKSEN,
as
Co-Trustees
of
the
HENRIKSEN FAMILY TRUST; CHARLES
HERVEY; CRAIG and LORI HICKMAN; WADE
A. & JOAl' C. HILLARD; WILLlAM and
BARBARA HIPP; KARL and MARGARET·
HIPPLE; MICHAEL B. HON and JOSEPH J.
HON; RICHARD W. HOYLE; RICK JENSEN, as
Trustee of the JENSEN FAMIL Y TRUST; HAL
JOSEPH; STEVEN D. and DAWN J. JOSLIN;

DANIEL
and
ANGELINA
KAUFMAN;
RICHARD and SHAUN KAY; KARIN KING, as
personal representative for the EST ATE OF
CHARLES R. KING, JR.; STEVE and JEANE
LAIRD; JOSE NICK and JAl' LARREA;
SHARON L. MACGREGOR, as Trustee of the
LEISY FAMILY LAND TRUST; CHAD E. and
REBECCA A. LONGSON; LEE S. and LEE ANN
LONGSON; ROBERT LOOPER; MARY LYNN
MACK; RUSSELL F. MCKINLEY; VIVIAN
MCKNIGHT, as Trustee of the EDWIN H. &
VIVIAN P. MCKNIGHT FAMILY TRUST;
CINDY KUBENA, as Trustee of the MILDRED I.
FERGUSON
TRUST;
DONNA
MOORE;
WILLIAM A. and GALE P. MOTT; STEPHEN
and ANN MURDOCH; EDWARD F. O'GARA,
as Trustee of the RDW ARD F. O'GARA III
FAMIL Y TRUST DATED JULY 8, 1982;
THOMAS & SHIRLEY O'NEIL; TODD M. and
KIMBERLY A. aSTRaY{; W. ANTHO~Y
PARK and GAIL CHALOUPKA; JOE and
KATHY PEARSON; PETERSON MOTOR CO.;
ROBERT J. and JOAN A. PISTEY, as Co-
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Trustees of the ROBERT & JOAN PISTEY
TRUST; JEANE E. RETTER; ROBERT D. and
KA TY 1. REYNOLDS; MICHAEL and
PAMELA RIDDLE; SUSAN C. ROURKE;
DA VID
ROUSSEAU; JOHN D. RULE;
EDWARD SLOAN, as Trustee of the S-5 i
FAMILY TRUST; DEBORAH T. ROSE, as:
Trustee of the SABALA-ROSE TRUST; G.
LANCE and CYNOY SALLAOA Y; CHARLES
and JAl'.'"KIFER SCHMOEGER; JAMES T.
SCHULZE; GARY SHERLOCK; FREDRIC V.
SHOEMAKER; SUSAN C. SHUFF; KENNETH
and BARBARA SMITH, as Co-Trustees of the
SMITH FAMIL Y TRUST; JOHN M. CLARK. as
Trustee of the STODDARD/CLARK CABIN
TRUST; GREGOR Y and JULIE SURABIAN;
CATHY PETERSON, as Trustee of THE
MCCALL CABIN TRUST; CHRISTOPHER C.
THOMPSON and JLLIE E. THOMPSON;
SCOTT THOMPSON; LINDA S. TURNER;
JO~ L. SIMMONS; SALLE C. UBERUAGA;
STEVEN C. and MARYANN WALKER; J.
LAMONTE WALKER, STEVEN C. WALKER
and JAN M. LOOMIS, as Co-Trustees of the

WALKER MARITAL TRUST~ MARY LESLIE
HUGHES, as Trustee of the MARY LESLIE
HUGHES TRUST; STEPHAN WHITE; ROSE A.
WREl'.TN; JAYSON ARMSTRONG, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF KANDACE
KEMP ARMSTRONG, K.A THY KEMP STEELE,
KAREN KEMP YOUNG and KA Y KEMP
DILLON; EDW ARO E. ZIMMER and AMY H.
ZIMMER, as Co-Trustees of THE ZIMMER
FAMILY TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 5,1998;
SCZANNE
ZIMMEIUvfAN;
GLORIA
B.
SALLADAY;
GREGG
and
SALLE
MIDDLEKAUFF; and JANET M. STEVENS,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

I

IDAHO BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS; !
and GEORGE BACON, in his official capacity as !
Director of the Idaho Department of Lands,

I
I

Defendants. _ _ _ _--Ji
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COME NOW Plaintiffs above-named. by and through their undersigned counsel of

record, and hereby move tbis Court to consolidate into and with this action Case No. CV OC
1023751, entitled Han. Lawrence G. Wasden, in his capacity as Attorney General of Idaho, ex

rei. State of Idaho Endowment Land Beneficiaries v. State Board of Land Commissioners, and
George Bacon, in his official capacity as Directory of the Idaho Department of Lands, filed in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
on December 2, 2010. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Consolidate and the Affidavits of W. Anthony Park and Mikela French in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion to Consolidate, filed herewith. This Motion is also supported by the pleadings
and other papers on file in this matter.
Per Fourth District Local Rule 11.1, this motion and the pleadings in support thereof have

been filed today in the Ada County case, Case No. CV OC 1023751.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

~ day of December, 2010.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, P.A.

By:

~~\\'k

Phillip S. Oberrecht - Of t e Finn
Colleen D. Zahn Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of
the following:

Merlyn W. Clark
D. John Ashby
HAWLEY, TROXELL, ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

ifU.S. r.,·1ail, Postage Prepaid
oo Overnight
Hand Delivered
Mail
o Telecopy 954-5210
D

Electronic Transmission
mcJark@hawleytroxell.com
jashbv;tilhawleytroxell.com

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

D

ATTORNEY GENERAL
Steven L. Olsen
Chief of Civil Litigation Division
Clay Smith
Deputy Attorneys General
nd
954 W. Jefferson, 2 Floor

D

o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Man
Telecopy 854-8073
Electronic Transmission

POBox 83720

Boise, ID 83720

Colleen D. Zahn
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